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Abstract
The presented research investigates topics relating to sensor systems focusing mainly on esti-
mation. The rst topic studies Byzantine attacks on sensor systems estimating the value of an
unknown deterministic parameter based on quantized observations. The presented work initially
describes aspects of the optimal processing under a practical family of attacks where the sensors
employ bad data detectors to check if the observed sensor data ts the observation models assumed
by the estimation algorithm under no attack. Next, the performance of any estimation approach
employed by the sensor system under any general attack is described for cases where any number
of observations, sensors, and quantization levels could be employed.
The second topic studies sensor networks focused on estimating ocean waveforms. Our work
is the rst to derive the Cramer-Rao bound (CRB) for the short-term forecasting of ocean waves.
The CRB is a lower bound on the mean square estimation error for an unbiased estimator. The
obtained results are general in the sense that they apply to a number of types of wave sensors.
A low-complexity estimation method is presented along with numerical results demonstrating its
accuracy and runtime performance. We also describe a method that relies on the CRB to calculate
the expected loss in absorbed power, under optimal control, by a single or multiple WEC devices
due to errors in the estimation of short-term future waveforms experienced by the devices.
The third topic focuses on developing a novel model accounting for the dependence of power
grids on communication networks for their safe and economic operation. Our model is formulated
as a two-settlement stochastic optimal power ow (OPF) problem where we account for errors in
forecasting while also considering random failures in the communication network.
Our work jointly optimizes the topology of the communication network and the control actions
in anticipation of the dierent random failures and errors that a given power grid may face. We
present results that identify optimal topologies for a communication network supporting the oper-
ation of an IEEE standard 9-bus system under dierent conditions and we discuss some properties
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of the optimal solutions.
Finally, the fourth topic studies topology estimation in power distribution networks. Accurate
topology estimates are crucial for maintaining situational awareness, properly dispatching dis-
tributed energy sources, detecting cyber attacks, and many other key tasks. The presented work
takes advantage of the ever increasing adoption of novel metering and sensing devices providing
data from network locations that were traditionally unmonitored by grid operators. We present a
topology estimation scheme for radial distribution networks relying on power ow measurements
and nodal load forecasts. We also describe a sensor placement method that enables the presented
scheme to identify all the detectable faults in the network. The performance of our detection
scheme is then demonstrated through several numerical results on the IEEE 123-bus test feeder.
2
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Attacks on Parameter Estimation Based on Quantized
Observations
Sensor systems employed for parameter estimation have been extremely successful in applica-
tions ranging from inexpensive commercial systems to complex military and defense surveillance
systems and have seen even greater interest in recent years [1]. Recent technological advances in
coding, digital wireless communications technology and digital electronics have lead to the dom-
inance of digital communications using quantized data in such systems. Hence, a great deal of
attention has focused on parameter estimation using quantized data [2{9]. In some work [2{4] the
unknown parameters are modeled as being random, while in other work the unknown parameters
are treated as deterministic unknowns [5{9]. Most of the existing work focused on binary quanti-
zation employed for the estimation of a single unknown parameter. However, [8] and [9] considered
some aspects of vector parameter cases for binary quantization.
Malicious attacks are widely regarded as one of the most serious problems faced in our dangerous
world, leading to several recent publications on this topic, including [10{20] and references therein.
The majority of the research related to sensor networks attempting to solve hypothesis testing and
parameter estimation problems has focused on Byzantine attacks [18, 21], in which an attacker
tampers with a subset of the sensors and forces them to send falsied messages to the fusion center
(FC) with the goal of interfering with the detection or estimation task at the FC. Byzantine attacks
on sensor networks attempting to perform hypothesis testing have been studied in [10,17{20], while
Byzantine attacks on networks performing parameter estimation have been studied in [11{13,22].
3
The presented work investigates Byzantine attacks on sensor systems estimating the value of an
unknown deterministic parameter based on quantized observations. We rst focus on the optimal
processing under a practical family of attacks where the sensors employ bad data detectors that
check if the observed sensor data ts the unattacked observation model assumed by the estimation
algorithm under no attack. Afterwards, the estimation performance is considered for any general
estimation approach employed by the sensor system under any general attack for cases where any
number of observations, sensors, and quantization levels could be employed and expressions are
derived to describe the performance of any specic estimation algorithm under such attacks.
1.2 Ocean Wave Estimation
Ocean wave energy holds the potential to become a signicant source of renewable energy.
Unfortunately, large costs associated with the production, deployment, and maintenance of wave
energy converters (WECs) present a challenge to their economic viability. As a result, extending
the lifetime of a WEC and maximizing the amount of energy it captures are of great interest.
To this end, several active control strategies have been developed where the controller adapts the
behavior or characteristics of a WEC in response to the prevailing ocean conditions in order to
more eectively capture the energy in the waves.
Complex-conjugate control [23] was the earliest control strategy considered for WEC devices
[24]. This control strategy focuses on heaving WECs and is formulated using a frequency based
description of WEC dynamics. Executing complex-conjugate control in the time domain was shown
in [24, 25] to require future information on the impending wave excitation forces. Alternative
control approaches that account for physical constraints on the motion of the WEC have also
been proposed. Latching control [26{28] is one such control strategy where the device is locked at
various points in the wave cycle and released later such that the device is always oscillating \in-
phase" with the incident excitation force. Since Latching control adapts to the incident excitation
force which is related to the motion of the WEC through a typically non-causal impulse response
function, this control strategy also requires knowledge of the future excitation forces acting on the
WEC. Another approach is Model Predictive Control (MPC) which has been the focus of several
recent work [29{35] on WEC control. A more comprehensive review of WEC control approaches
is provided in [36]. The focus of our work is on providing wave estimates that might be required
by a current or novel approach for WEC control.
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The presented work investigates several aspects of the estimation and short-term prediction of
ocean waves using a network of spatially distributed sensors. We present general expressions for
the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) and the Cramer Rao Bound (CRB). Our work is among the
rst to account for noise in the sensor observations and employ tools from estimation theory to
derive expressions providing lower bounds on the estimation performance. Also presented is a low-
complexity estimation approach for the case where several stationary ocean sensors are employed
for estimation. We provide several numerical results to highlight the estimation accuracy of our
approach relative the CRB. Further, we present a method that relates errors in estimation to the
mean loss in the amount of absorbed power by WEC devices.
1.3 Stochastic Optimal Power Flow Under Forecast Errors
and Failures in Communication
The reliable and economic operation of an electric grid is a complex problem involving several
dierent tasks. Managing and executing such tasks requires collecting a great deal of information
delivered to grid operators through communication networks. Upon receiving new data, an op-
erator may seek to modify specic properties or values in the electric grid through transmitting
control commands back to the grid through the communication network. Clearly, this creates a
dependency where failures, malfunctions, or other unexpected changes aecting components in the
communication network could destabilize or even interrupt the operation of the electric grid or
some parts of it. In fact, the work in [37] showed that failures or attacks aecting the communica-
tion of sensor measurements to system operators may result in consistent and sustained economic
losses due to the misinformed operation of the grid.
Most related work has focused on the study of cascading failures under an interdependent model
where the communication network relies on the power grid for its operation. The study of inter-
dependent networks using a mathematical framework was rst undertaken by the authors of [38]
who focused on the interdependency between two abstract randomly-generated networks having
the same number of nodes. Focusing on power networks, the work in [39] applied interdependency
models from [38] to a non-random graph representing the Italian power grid,which suered a large
blackout in the year 2003 [40], and its supporting communication network. The recent work in [41]
and [42] incorporated Kircho's laws and simple control operations into their models. The work
in [41] presented a load shedding algorithm that aims to mitigate the eects of failures in a random
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communication network supporting the operation of a power grid while the work in [42] studied
the eect of communication failures on state estimation and the delivery of control signals. In
both cases, the work in [41] and [42] assumed a given communication network with pre-dened
interdependencies and did not focus on identifying robust communication networks tailored to the
power grids they support although the work in [41] stressed the importance of this step. In fact,
the authors of [41] and [42] found that their results were sensitive to the assumed communication
topology and that some of the phenomena observed by studying random abstract interdependent
networks [38,43{47] may not hold for power networks supported by well designed communication
networks. Further, they cautioned that communication networks designed in isolation of the power
grids they will support may be unable to withstand or mitigate the eects of interdependence on
the system as a whole.
In the presented work, we focus on identifying the optimal communication network topology
and the optimal choice for dispatch and re-dispatch actions while accounting for forecasting errors
and failures in communication. Our problem is formulated as a stochastic optimal power ow
(OPF) problem [48{51] where the objective is to minimize the average overall economic cost of
operating the system under a set of constraints representing the stochastic scenarios that may result
from possible forecasting errors and communication failures. We believe our work is the rst to
jointly consider the eects of forecast errors and failures in communication and study them under
a stochastic OPF formulation where the communication topology is also optimized. Our unique
formulation describes the communication network as a ow network where any node representing
a sensor measuring physical values from the power grid is assigned a positive `supply' and the
node representing the system operator is assigned a negative supply. This description allows our
optimization problem to capture the eect of losing the ability to communicate between any sensor
and the system operator as a loss in the ow supply from the aected sensor. We present results
obtained using our model under test cases that we use to validate our model and identify the best
communication topologies for the power system we consider.
1.4 Topology Estimation in Power Distribution Networks
As novel controls, applications, and services continue to be integrated into distribution systems,
the demand for accurate and timely estimates of the network topology is becoming increasingly
more critical [52]. Maintaining situational awareness in distribution networks is imperative for
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the eectiveness of many important modern tools and applications that are currently being im-
plemented and developed. For example, having a correct estimate of the network topology is
crucial for eciently and reliably dispatching distributed energy resources [53], sectioning into
microgrids [54], and providing demand response [55] capabilities. Further, many techniques for
distribution system state estimation (DSSE), [56{58] for example, are based on the assumption
that the correct network topology is already known. In fact, the performance of most DSSE
methods under a misspecied topology is generally not well understood and may be dicult to
characterize.
Due to several engineering and practical concerns, distribution networks are predominately
operated as radial (tree) graphs where power ows in one direction away from the root node
typically taken as the main feeder. Their special characteristics have traditionally led to fewer
installed sensors and monitoring devices making distribution networks historically less observable
than transmission systems which tend to have complex mesh topologies and extensive monitoring.
As a result of the dierences between the two systems, topology estimation techniques devised
for transmission systems [59{62] have limited applicability in distribution networks and there is a
need for methods and techniques designed especially for distribution networks.
Many topology estimation eorts in distribution networks are based on information obtained
through phone calls from customers or expert systems [63] to identify and locate outages in the
network. Other knowledge-based methods combining dierent types of information [64] have also
been proposed to include data from advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Voltage sag measurements and matching has also
been studied for fault detection in [65] and [66]. However, the majority of these methods were
generally limited in the number of simultaneous outages they are able to detect.
Fortunately, recent advances in the development of measurement units and the increased adop-
tion of monitoring devices will produce new and reliable data streams that may lead to improved
topology estimation techniques capable of detecting several topology changes. In fact, some new
phasor measurement units [67] are being designed specically for distribution networks with promis-
ing results and new topology estimation methods [68, 69] assuming their widespread adoption are
already being proposed. Relying on a limited number of sensors, the insightful work in [70, 71]
uncovered some foundational properties for the topology estimation problem in distribution net-
works. In their work, the authors of [70, 71] show that the topology estimation problem, referred
to as outage detection in [70, 71], for radial distribution networks can be decoupled into smaller
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detection problems within subtrees of the same network.
In our work, we study the topology estimation and fault detection problem based on infre-
quent and slow-changing nodal load forecasts and power ow measurements obtained from sensing
devices installed at a subset of the nodes in the network. Aided by the decoupling of the full prob-
lem, detailed in [71], we propose a novel sensor placement scheme allowing for the identication
of any number of detectable faults in the system. Further, we present a novel topology estimation
scheme designed to limit our dependence on unavoidable enumeration operations that could in-
crease the numerical complexity of the scheme. We also present numerical results demonstrating
the performance of our proposed estimation scheme.
1.5 Outline of The Dissertation
The reset of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents our work considering
attacks on systems estimating an unknown deterministic parameter based on quantized observa-
tions. Next in Chapter 3, our research regarding the estimation and short-term forecasting of
ocean waves for the use by WEC devices is presented. Chapter 4 describes our work on the joint
optimization of communication networks and power ow control under forecast errors and fail-
ures in communication. Finally, Chapter 5 describes our work on topology estimation and fault
detection in radial distribution networks.
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Chapter 2
Attacks on Systems Estimating an
Unknown Deterministic
Parameter Based on Quantized
Observations
The existing work on Byzantine attacks on estimation systems [11{13, 22] has covered a wide
variety of topics, including a game theoretic analysis and mitigation schemes, but has not in-
vestigated the topic of optimum processing of the attacked and unattacked sensor observations.
The work in [72] considered the optimum processing, under an asymptotically large number of
observations, for attacks that modify the quantized sensor data such that P distinct attacks are
launched on P distinct sets of sensors. However, the results in [72] are restricted to cases with
binary quantization and where a shift-in-mean parameter is to be estimated.
In the rst section of this chapter, we consider a practical attack scenario where the sensors
employ bad data detectors that check if the observed sensor data ts the unattacked observation
model assumed by the estimation algorithm. Only sensor data which passes the checks made by the
bad data detectors will be employed in the subsequent estimation procedure. To be more specic,
we are assuming that a bad data detector will collect observations from a single sensor and compute
some similarity index between the empirically observed probability density function (pdf) and the
possible pdfs assumed under no attack, which are parameterized by the unknown the parameter of
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interest. Then, as the number of observations per sensor becomes very large, the only way for an
attacked sensor to pass the bad data detector is if the pdf of the observations at the sensor is that
of observations at an unattacked sensor, but with a dierent value for the unknown parameter.
In such cases, spoong attacks, which modify the physical phenomenon observed by the sensors,
become of considerable interest since, unlike in man-in-the-middle attacks, the attacker can launch
spoong attacks which are guaranteed to pass the bad data detectors even if the attacker has
no knowledge regarding the quantizers employed by the sensor system or the true value of the
parameter to be estimated. In fact, low complexity spoong attacks capable of generating data
that is guaranteed to pass bad data detectors in this way have been employed in practice, but
have not been studied in previous work on attacks on estimation systems. Consider the case where
we want to estimate the position of an emitter or reector by estimating the time taken for the
signal to reach an antenna. One practical example of a spoong attack is when the attacker uses
a memory device to capture and regenerate the signal in order to add an extra time delay to it
when it nally reaches the antenna. As one example, this basic idea has been exploited [73] in
Civilian GPS systems which were been shown to be highly vulnerable to such attacks. Radar
systems have also been attacked in this way. In this chapter we assume the attacker launches one
of these spoong attacks that are guaranteed to pass the bad data detectors while considering
general estimation problems.
Given that the attacked sets of sensors can be identied at the fusion center using a procedure
dierent from the bad data detectors, we show in this chapter that the attacked sensor data cannot
be employed to improve the estimation performance beyond that achieved by optimum processing
of the unattacked sensor data for cases with a sucient number of observations. These results are
valid for arbitrary quantizer designs and for a large set of estimation problems.
While optimum processing is of considerable interest, the impact of attacks on both optimum
and suboptimum processing is also of great interest. For example, information about estima-
tion performance under dierent attacks could be used to determine the dierent advantages and
disadvantages provided by dierent estimation approaches. In the second section of this chap-
ter, we provide a general approach to characterize the after-attack estimation performance of any
estimation approach, optimum or suboptimum, under any general type of attack, without any as-
sumptions on the estimation problem, the observation models, the number of sensors, the number
of observations or the independence of any observations to any others. A classication of these
attacks, which are much more general than those assumed in the rst section of this chapter,
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that categorizes them into classes according to the information available to the attacking entity is
introduced and some notable properties of these attack classes are studied and highlighted using
examples. Optimization problems over these attack classes are solved to provide, for the rst time,
expressions which describe the performance of any specic estimation algorithm under the most
devastating attacks with full information and the generally less eective information free attacks.
Lastly, constraints on the dierent classes of attacks are considered to nd the most devastating
attacks under some level of attack detection carried out by the sensor system. These ideas are
illustrated by considering the degradation in estimation performance under the appropriately con-
strained most devastating attacks with full information and the generally less eective information
free attacks. Such investigations could be of signicant practical importance as some legacy or
even modern systems might not have been designed to detect and react to attacks.
The following assumptions and notations will be used throughout this chapter. We consider
the estimation of a deterministic parameter  where  2 <. The parameter  is estimated based
on quantized observations collected from N sensors, each producing K observations. The NK
observations are collected in the vector u = (u11; u12; : : : ; uNK)
T where ujk; j = 1; 2; : : : ; N; k =
1; 2; : : : ;K is the quantized version of xjk, the unquantized output of sensor j at discrete time k
which has a pdf f(xjkj) that is parameterized by . At each sensor, the number of quantization
levels used is assumed to be R such that each ujk can take any value from 1, 2, : : : , R. Perfect, error-
free communication of u to the fusion center is assumed. In the case of no attack, the probability
of the vector u having a specic value r for a given value of  is described by Pr(u = rj).
When attacked, the eect of the attack is captured completely by the after-attack probabilities
Pr(~u = rj) for every possible realization of r, where ~u denotes the after-attack vector of quantized
observations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 considers the optimum
processing of the attacked and unattacked sensor data when bad data detection is employed at
each sensor, provided the sets of attacked sensors are identied. Section 2.2 considers the impact
of general types of attacks on general types of estimation approaches and describes the most
devastating attacks which employ full information and the generally less eective information free
attacks. An example where an estimation system, which uses the estimation approach it would use
assuming no attack, experiences full information and information free attacks is given. Further,
constraints on the considered attacks, employed to account for some level of attack detection under
the described attack classes, are studied and an example showing the impact of such attacks is
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presented. Finally, Section 2.3 summarizes and concludes the work presented in the chapter.
2.1 Asymptotically Optimum Processing under Sensor Bad
Data Detection
In this section, we consider attacks that are launched without knowledge of the quantizers
employed by the sensor system or the true value of the parameter to be estimated, but that still
produce data guaranteed to pass the bad data detectors. The focus is on cases where the unattacked
sensor observations are statistically independent and identically distributed (iid) across all sensors
and time epochs. The following assumptions are made throughout this section.
Assumption 1. The pdf of the unquantized observations at time k and unattacked sensor j,
f(xjkj), is a twice dierentiable log-concave [74] function of  which obeys regularity (smoothness)
conditions such that interchanges involving derivatives (up to order 2) with respect to  and integrals
with respect to xjk of f(xjkj) are valid.
Assumption 2. The unattacked observations at dierent sensors and times xjk; j = 1; : : : ; N; k =
1; : : : ;K are iid. All xjk are quantized using the same thresholds which are xed over all j =
1; : : : ; N and k = 1; : : : ;K.
The common quantizer design is described by the regions A1; : : : ; AR such that if the quantizer
input falls into the region A` then the output is the symbol `. Thus for k = 1; : : : ;K; j = 1; : : : ; N ,
dene the probability mass function (pmf) of the quantized version of xjk as
Pr(ujk = rjkj) =
Z
xjk2Arjk
f(xjkj)dxjk; rjk = 1; : : : ; R (2.1)
and denote the indicator function I(rjk = r
0
jk) as taking on the value unity when rjk = r
0
jk and
zero otherwise. Let J dene a set of sensor indices that correspond to a set of selected sensors.
Thus the members of J are selected from 1; : : : ; N . Under no attack and by Assumption 2, the
pmf of the vector of selected quantized observations uJ evaluated at uJ = r is
Pr(uJ = rj) =
Y
j2J
KY
k=1
RY
r0jk=1
Pr(ujk = r
0
jkj)I(rjk=r
0
jk): (2.2)
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The log-likelihood function evaluated at uJ = r, the natural logarithm of (2.2), is
L(;J ) =
X
j2J
KX
k=1
RX
r0jk=1
I(rjk = r
0
jk) lnPr(ujk = r
0
jkj): (2.3)
To guarantee the attack will pass the bad data detector without knowledge of the quantizers
employed and the true parameter value, the attackers employ attacks that follow the same model
as in (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) but with  replaced by    e for some acceptable e, leading to the
following assumption which is also employed throughout this section.
Assumption 3. The pdf of the unquantized observations at time k and attacked sensor j is
f(xjkj   e); where f(xjkj) follows Assumption 1
Consider a general case where there are P such attacks that each employ a dierent and non-
zero value for e, denoted by ep; p = 1; : : : ; P and the unattacked sensors are considered to be
aected by the 0th attack for which e0 = 0. Assume that the indices of all sensors under the p
th
attack are described by the set Ap and, for a suciently large N , the number of these sensors
jApj is a xed non-zero percentage Pp of the total number of sensors, N . Such an assumption is
required so that as N ! 1 the eect of an attack will not shrink to zero (Ap becoming a set of
measure zero). Further, the sets A0;A1; : : : ;AP are disjoint and cover J so that
J =
[
p=0;:::;P
Ap and Ap
\
Ap0 = ; if p 6= p0: (2.4)
For the general case just described and from (2.2), the pmf of the quantized observations uJ at
the selected sensors j 2 J evaluated at uJ = r becomes
Pr(uJ = rj) =
PY
p=0
Y
j2Ap
KY
k=1
RY
r0jk=1
Pr(ujk = r
0
jkj   ep)I(rjk=r
0
jk);Pp = jApj
N
xed: (2.5)
Note that (2.5) includes the case where some sensors are unattacked since e0 = 0.
In order to gain a better understanding of what is presented next, consider the Fisher Infor-
mation obtained from a selected set of sensors, some unattacked and others attacked with known
13
e1; : : : ; eP , which can be shown to be
J() = jA0jK
RX
r0jk=1
R
xjk2Ar0
jk
d
df(xjkj)dxjk
2
R
xjk2Ar0
jk
f(xjkj)dxjk +
PX
p=1
jApjK
RX
r0jk=1
R
xjk2Ar0
jk
d
df(xjkj   ep)dxjk
2
R
xjk2Ar0
jk
f(xjkj   ep)dxjk : (2.6)
The rst term on the right of the equality sign in (2.6) represents information from the unattacked
sensors and the second term represents information from attacked sensors. Now consider the
following lemma, based on (2.6), which is concerned with the case of attacks that are perfectly
known.
Lemma 1. With e1; : : : ; eP known in (2.5), an ecient (Cramer Rao bound (CRB) achieving)
unbiased estimator of  will generally utilize the attacked observations in the process of estimating
.
Contrast the just described Lemma with the following theorem based on the special structure
of the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) for problems of the type given in (2.5).
Theorem 1. With the attacked sensors in (2.5) known (know all Ap for which jepj > 0) but
the corresponding magnitudes of the attacks (ep when jepj > 0) unknown, the mean-square error
(MSE) of an ecient unbiased estimator of  is as large or larger than the MSE of an ecient
unbiased estimator that knows the magnitudes of the attacks for any nite K (from (2.6)). In fact,
the MSE of the ecient unbiased estimator of  when the attack magnitudes are unknown but the
attacked sensors are known is that of an ecient unbiased estimator that only uses the unattacked
observations for any value of K.
Proof. Let J0 denote the rst sum in (2.6) and let Jp, p = 1; 2; : : : P denote the p
th term from the
second sum in (2.6), then the FIM J(), where  = (; e1; e2; : : : ; eP )
0, when the attacked sensors
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are known but the corresponding magnitudes of the attacks are unknown is
J() =
2666666666664
J0 + J1 + : : : JP  J1  J2 : : :  JP
 J1 J1 0 : : : 0
 J2 0 J2 : : : 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
 JP 0 0 : : : JP
3777777777775
: (2.7)
The MSE of an ecient unbiased estimator of  is the rst element on the diagonal of the inverse
of (2.7) and due to the special structure of (2.7), it can be shown to be, as one might expect, given
by
[J 1()]1;1 =
1
J0
 1
J0 +
PP
p=1 Jp
; (2.8)
where 1
J0+
PP
p=1 Jp
is the reciprocal of (2.6), which is the MSE of an ecient estimator of  that
knows the magnitudes of the attacks. The last statement in the theorem can be proved by a direct
comparison between [J 1()]1;1 and the MSE of an ecient unbiased estimator that only uses the
unattacked observation.
The asymptotic identication of the attacked sensors is discussed in1 [75].
The next section considers the impact of general types of attacks on general types of estimation
approaches and describes the most devastating attacks which employ full information and the
generally less eective information free attacks.
2.2 Bounds on the Performance of General Estimation Ap-
proaches under General Attacks
In this section, we consider the estimation of a deterministic parameter  such that  2 [
l;
h]
for some known nite 
l and 
h. The most general attacks will change the after-attack probabilities
Pr(~u = rj) in an arbitrary way as opposed to the specic changes considered in Section 2.1. Since
there exists a wide range for such possible attacks, there is a need to classify the various types of
possible attacks and to describe their impact on systems employing general estimation approaches.
1The asymptotic identication of the attacked sensors was based on work by Jiangfan Zhang and is thus excluded
from this dissertation
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Working towards this goal, a classication for attacks is presented in this section that separates the
attacks according to the knowledge or information available to the entity carrying out the attack
about the estimation system it is attacking and the true value of the parameter being estimated.
Having full information, which describes the most devastating type of attacks, is dened as knowing
the design of the quantizer used at each sensor, the estimation algorithm employed at the fusion
center, and the true value of the parameter to be estimated. The least informed attacks, described
as information free attacks, are those attacks that lack any information in regards to the design
of the quantizers, the estimation algorithm, or the true value of the parameter being estimated.
Adopting the mean square error (MSE) as a performance metric throughout the remaining part
of this chapter, the eect on the estimation performance of the dierent attacks just described is
presented in the following theorems. The same analysis can be carried out using other metrics as
well. The following theorem describes full information attacks.
Theorem 2. Without any loss of generality, consider an attack on only the rst p sensors (all
times) with quantized samples ~up = rp. Denote the quantized observations at the other sensors
as uo = ro so that the full vector of quantized observations presented to the fusion center is
~u = (~up;uo) = (rp; ro). The general estimation rule based on the actual realization of the quantized
observations is denoted by ^(~u). Assume the attacker is unable to observe the realizations of uo
and is also unable to change them and that the attacker has full information concerning the actual
value of  and the estimation system. Then the largest MSE of any such attack when p = N is
MSE(^)OCU = max
r
(^(r)  )2: (2.9)
An attack resulting in this MSE is called an optimum complete knowledge uncoordinated attack
(OCU). When 0 < p < N the MSE under an OCU attack is
MSE(^)OCU =
X
all ro
Pr(uo = roj)(^((rp; ro))  )2 (2.10)
where rp is an rp maximizing
P
all ro Pr(uo = roj)(^((rp; ro)) )2. If p = 0 then the unattacked
performance is achieved.
If the attacker is able to observe the realizations of both uo and up but is only able to change
up, while still having full information, then the attack is called the optimum complete knowledge
coordinated attack (OCC). The largest possible MSE under an OCC attack, which is larger than
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or equal to (2.10) becomes
MSE(^)OCC =
X
all ro
max
rp

Pr(uo = roj)(^((rp; ro))  )2

(2.11)
when 0 < p < N . For p = N , an OCC attack provides the same largest possible MSE as an OCU
attack.
Proof. In the general case, the MSE can be written as
MSE(^) =
X
all r
Pr(~u = rj)(^(r)  )2 (2.12)
=
X
all rp
X
all ro
Pr(~up = rp;uo = roj)(^((rp; ro))  )2: (2.13)
If the attacker is unable to observe the realizations of uo and is also unable to change them, then
the attacker is forced to attack with a ~up that must be independent from uo. In this case (2.13)
becomes
MSE(^)OCU =
X
all rp
Pr(~up = rpj)
X
all ro
Pr(uo = roj)(^((rp; ro))  )2: (2.14)
As the attacker has control over only Pr(~up = rpj), (2.14) is maximized by putting all the
probability mass on Pr(~up = r

pj) where rp is an rp maximizing
P
all ro Pr(uo = roj)(^((rp; ro)) 
)2 and, hence, (2.10) follows. If p = N then r = rp so the same maximization can be applied to
(2.12), now putting all probability mass on the r that maximizes (^(r)  )2.
For an OCC attack, (2.13) is expressed as
MSE(^)OCC =
X
all rp
X
all ro
Pr(~up = rpjuo = ro; )Pr(uo = roj)(^((rp; ro))  )2: (2.15)
Now for each realization of uo, the attacker can choose a dierent realization of ~up by setting
Pr(~up = rpjuo = ro; ) in (2.15). Thus, the attacker can maximize (2.15), by picking Pr(~up =
rpjuo = ro; ) = 1 for the rp that makes Pr(uo = roj)(^((rp; ro))  )2 largest for the given ro. In
this case the MSE becomes (2.11).
An OCC attack maximizes the MSE for each possible realization of uo which results in the
largest possible MSE values and, therefore, the MSE under an OCC attack outlines the upper
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boundary of the achievable MSE by an attack. Using MSE curves produced under OCC attacks
should allow system designers to quantify the worst case under-attack performance of their systems.
This could be employed as one of the design criteria for estimation systems where the worst case
performance is required to be smaller than a certain tolerable MSE value. Further, considering
the MSE values under a given number of OCC-attacked sensors can provide system designers
with information regarding the number of sensors that need to be protected in order to guarantee
MSE values smaller than a certain tolerable MSE value. Another use is to obtain these curves
for dierent estimation approaches in order to compare their performance under attacks. The
following denes an information free attack and presents a theorem considering the estimation
performance under such attacks.
Denition 1. Under an information free (IF) attack,
Pr(~up = rpj) =

1
R
pK
; 8rp; (2.16)
where p is the number of attacked sensors and ~up is the vector of quantized observations from the
p attacked sensors.
Remark 1. An (IF) attack is attempting to model a case where the attacker has no information
regarding the true value of , the estimation algorithm used at the fusion center, the threshold
values employed for quantizing the sensor observations, or the interpretation of the quantized sensor
observations. Further, the attack is unable to accumulate any information over the duration of the
attack. Here it is assumed that the sensors and fusion center can essentially employ coding to hide
the true values of quantized data. As a result, each attacked sensor must be attacked in a way
that appears completely random and uncoordinated when viewed over many realizations, resulting
in all the possible values for any attacked quantized sensor sample being equally likely. Since we
are interested in statistically characterizing the average performance of the system, such a model
seems appropriate. Note that the model makes it impossible for the attackers to repeatedly produce
the same attack owing to the attackers inability to interpret the attacked samples throughout their
attack.
Remark 2. An attack which turns out to be mathematically equivalent to IF attacks was introduced
in [22] where it was called a `blinding' attack. The approach in [22] is dierent from the one adopted
here and the authors of [22] provide an alternative argument that motivates the attacker to resort
to this attack.
18
Theorem 3. Under Denition 1, and without loss of generality, consider an IF attack on only the
rst p sensors (all times) with quantized observations ~up = rp. Denote the quantized observations
at the other sensors as uo = ro so that the full vector of quantized observations presented to the
fusion center is ~u = (~up;uo) = (rp; ro). Then, the MSE when p = N is
MSE(^)IF =

1
R
NK X
all r
(^(r)  )2: (2.17)
When 0 < p < N the MSE of an IF attack is
MSE(^)IF =

1
R
pK
X
all rp
X
all ro
Pr(uo = roj)(^((rp; ro))  )2: (2.18)
If p = 0, there is no attack.
Proof. Since the attacker does not have any information about the estimation system or the true
value of , the changes this attacker makes are completely random and unrelated to how the
estimation system is operating and to the true value of . Thus, the IF attack can be modeled as
the attacker observing a quantized sensor value r0jk and then modifying r
0
jk to each of its possible
values2 1; : : : ; R with equal probability of 1R . This mapping implies the conditional pmf of the
modied value ~ujk = rjk given the unmodied value ujk = r
0
jk is Pr(~ujk = rjkjujk = r0jk) = 1R so
that the assumption of uncoordinated (independent) attacks on all sensors implies
Pr(~u = rj) =
X
all r0
Pr(~u = rju = r0)Pr(u = r0j)
=
X
all r0
0@ NY
j=1
KY
k=1
1
R
1APr(u = r0j)
=

1
R
NK 0@X
all r0
Pr(u = r0j)
1A
=

1
R
NK
(2.19)
2Another IF attack could be described where the attacker modies the value of r0jk to each of its possible values
except for the original one with equal probability of 1
R 1 . The analysis would be nearly identical and is, therefore,
omitted.
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which is independent of . For an attack on only the rst p sensors
Pr(~u = rj) =X
all r0p
Pr(~u = rpju = r0p)Pr(~up = r0p;uo = roj)
=

1
R
pK X
all r0p
Pr(~up = r
0
p;uo = roj)
=

1
R
pK
Pr(uo = roj): (2.20)
Using (2.19) and (2.20) in (2.12), the theorem follows
Although IF attacks lack any information regarding the parameter to be estimated and the
estimation algorithm employed by the system, IF attacks are still capable of causing signicant
increases in the after-attack MSE values in some cases. Next, an example problem showing the
eect of the dierent attacks just introduced is presented.
2.2.1 An example: Maximum Likelihood estimation of a Constant in
Truncated Gaussian Noise
Consider the case where each sensor observes a constant  2 [ 3; 3] observed in truncated zero-
mean unit-variance Gaussian noise. The noise is truncated to represent the case where the sensors
produce only nite valued observations in the range [ 5; 5] prior to quantization, which may be
considered more realistic. For the analysis, we employ a system comprised of eight sensors that
each transmit a single quantized observation to a fusion center with perfect transmission. Under
no attack, the observations at dierent sensors xj1; j = 1; : : : ; N are assumed to be statistically
independent and identically distributed (iid). Further, the sensors are assumed to use identically
designed three-level quantizers having lower and upper thresholds of -1 and 1, respectively. For all
the presented gures, the estimation algorithm used at the fusion center is taken to be maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation under no attack, where the estimate ^(r)ML is dened to be the solution
to max L(;J ), where L(;J ) is the log-likelihood function.
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2.2.2 Estimating a Constant in Truncated Gaussian Noise
Using the estimation system just described, and with four out of the eight sensors being at-
tacked, Figure 2.1 shows the resulting MSE values for the estimation under the dierent attacks
described in this section. Figure 2.1 also shows that, for the considered case, an attack having
full information always provides an MSE which is at least twice as large when compared to the
IF attack, which is the one lacking any information. System designers can use gures similar to
θ = True Constant Value
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MSE vs True Constant Value for different attack classes
No attack
OCC attack
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IF attack
Figure 2.1: MSE for Constant in Truncated Gaussian estimation with N = 8;K = 1.
Figure 2.1 in order to understand the possible impacts of attacks on dierent estimation algorithms
and quantizer designs for a specic estimation problem.
Figure 2.2 shows the MSE curves under an increasing number of OCC attacked sensors for
the same estimation system. OCC attacks are the most devastating attacks since the attacker has
complete information regarding the parameter being estimated and the estimation system as a
whole, including the employed estimation algorithm. Therefore, system designers can use gures
similar to Figure 2.2 in order to deduce the number of sensors that need to be protected in order
to guarantee MSE levels below a certain tolerable value.
2.2.3 Special properties for IF attacks
In gure 2.3, the same estimation system described earlier is used with the only exception of
changing the thresholds of the quantizers from -1 and 1 to  Q 1( 13 ) and Q 1( 13 ) respectively
21
θ = True Constant Value
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
M
SE
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
MSE vs True Constant Value for OCC attacks
no attack
1 attacked
2 attacked
3 attacked
4 attacked
5 attacked
6 attacked
7 attacked
8 attacked
Figure 2.2: MSE for Constant in Truncated Gaussian estimation with N = 8;K = 1 and
an increasing number of OCC attacked sensors.
where Q 1 is inverse of the Q function, which is dened as Q(x) = 1p
2
R1
x
e
 u2
2 du. This choice
for the thresholds sets Pr(~u = rj) = 1=R for all r when  = 0. Such a quantizer setting disarms
the IF attack when  = 0 by starting with (2.19) even before the IF attack. As a result, this creates
a point (at  = 0) of insensitivity towards IF attacks regardless of the number of sensors attacked.
This is shown in Figure 2.3. In general, system designers can choose the set of thresholds used in
the quantizers such that a point of insensitivity towards IF attacks occurs at any given value of .
Another interesting result shown in Figure 2.3 that is not seen in Figure 2.1 is that there exists a
region for the parameter values where the after-attack MSE is smaller than the unattacked MSE.
This indicates that defending against some attacks might not be necessary for some values of the
parameter being estimated since the IF attack is a random attack and it can actually result in
improved MSE values.
2.2.4 Bounds on the Performance of Constrained General Estimation
Approaches under General Attacks
In this subsection, we consider a case where the system employs some attack detection method
that constrains the passable attacks faced by the system. One way to make this possible could be
through spending extra resources on a selected set of sensors to protect them from being attacked.
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Figure 2.3: MSE for Constant in Truncated Gaussian estimation with N = 8;K = 1
showing IF insensitive point.
With a certain number of sensors protected against attacks, the information from those sensors
could be used by the fusion center to estimate the nominal unattacked pmf of the quantized data
which can then be compared to the estimated pmf of the data originating from unprotected sensors.
Now, with no loss of generality, consider an attack on only the rst p sensors (all times)3 with
quantized samples ~up = rp which is characterized by the attacked pmf Pr(~up = rpj) and let
Pr(up = rpj) denote the nominal unattacked pmf. Denote the quantized observations at the
unattacked sensors as uo = ro so that the full vector of quantized observations presented to the
fusion center is ~u = (~up;uo) = (rp; ro). A sensor system where the fusion center rejects data when
a suitable distance, for example
g(p; ~p) =
X
all rp

Pr(~up = rpj)  Pr(up = rpj)
2
(2.21)
3A marginally more general attack model could allow for an attack that chooses, at each time epoch, to either
corrupt the measurements or leave them unaltered. We worked out expressions for such attacks and they were
deemed to be a trivial extension of the work presented here. Consequently, those results were excluded.
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is larger than a certain threshold, d, will have a maximum MSE given by
max
fPr(~up=rpj);8rpg
X
all rp
X
all ro
Pr(~up = rpj)Pr(uo = roj~up = rp; )(^((rp; ro))  )2
subject to
X
all rp
Pr(~up = rpj) = 1;
g(p; ~p)  d;
0 < Pr(~up = rpj) < 1; 8rp; (2.22)
which, when compared to the general attacks described in this section turns out to be an OCU
attack with the added constraint that g(p; ~p)  d. For the case where the attacker has no
information, it is not possible for the attacker to optimize the attack as proposed in (2.22). Instead,
the attacker could resort to some generalization of the information free attack which incorporates
the constraint that g(p; ~p)  d. The powerful entropy concept [76], a natural measure for the
randomness of some observations, suggests replacing the objective function in (2.22) with
max
fPr(~up=rpj);8rpg

 
X
all rp
Pr(~up = rpj) log (Pr(~up = rpj))

; (2.23)
under the same constraints. The objective-maximizing solution in this case is the set of values
Pr(~up = rpj) for all rp. After this solution is obtained, the MSE value is given by substituting
the appropriate value for Pr(~up = rpj) in (2.14). It can be shown that (2.23) reduces to (2.18)
when d is suciently large so (2.23) does generalize IF attacks in this sense.
There exists many suitable algorithms for solving the optimization problems in (2.22) and
(2.23). One possible algorithm is to start with the solution Pr(~up = rpj) = Pr(up = rpj); 8rp
and then start shifting probability mass from the rp making the smallest contribution to the metric
being optimized to the rp making the largest contribution, until a constraint is reached. If the
constraint reached is Pr(~up = rpj) = 0 for some rp then the component of the pmf Pr(~up = rpj)
for that rp has been emptied and one should start emptying mass from the rp making the next
smallest contribution to the metric. The optimum solution is reached when g(p; ~p) = d is satised
or when Pr(~up = rpj) = 1 for some rp which indicates that all the probability mass has been
emptied into the rp making largest contribution to the objective function. The algorithm is justied
based on the fact that each step always increases the objective function without violating any
constraints. In fact, each step provides the largest possible increase from the last solution with the
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given amount of probability transferred.
Figure 2.4 shows the dierent achievable MSE curves under dierent values of the distance
constraint value, d in (2.22). The same sensor system employed in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 was used
to generate Figure 2.4 with the exception of using only three senors instead of eight. The jumps
in the curves are the result of a change in the ordering of the rp making the smallest contribution
to the objective function for dierent values of . When the rps are emptied in a dierent order
for a dierent , a jump in the MSE curve results. From Figure 2.4, it can be seen that smaller
values of d result in limiting the attack and having better MSE values.
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Figure 2.4: MSE for Constant in Truncated Gaussian estimation with N = 3;K = 1
with varying distance constraint values under an OCU attack.
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, attacks on systems estimating an unknown deterministic parameter based on
quantized observations were studied. As bad data detectors are frequently employed in practice,
initially, we considered attacks that pass bad data detectors employed at the sensors that check
that the sensor data ts the unattacked observation model assumed by the estimation approach.
The class of attacks considered include attacks that cannot be represented by the previously
studied man-in-the-middle attacks for general estimation problems. For example, they include
spoong attacks which have not been extensively studied for attacks on sensor networks performing
25
parameter estimation. Assuming that all the observations are independent, we demonstrated that
the optimum processing will discard all the observations from the attacked sensors and that the
estimation performance cannot be improved beyond that achieved through the optimum processing
of unattacked sensor data for cases with a sucient number of observations, provided the sets of
attacked sensors are identied at the fusion center. These results are valid for arbitrary quantization
schemes, any estimation problem, and any attack which passes the bad data detectors.
In the second section, we provided a general approach to characterize the after-attack estimation
performance of any optimum or suboptimum approach under any general type of attack, with
no assumptions on the estimation problem, the observation models, the number of sensors or
observations, or the dependence of the observations. The general attacks were classied into the
full information OCC and OCU attacks and the generally less eective IF attacks. Expressions
which describe the performance of any specic estimation algorithm under these attack classes
were provided. We showed that a quantizer can be designed such that there exists a value of
the parameter at which the estimation performance is insensitive to IF attacks regardless of the
number of attacked sensors. Further, a case where the after-attack MSE under an IF attack is
smaller than the unattacked MSE was presented. To account for some level of attack detection
carried out by the sensor system, constraints on the attack classes were considered and methods
to obtain the after-attack MSE in these cases were described.
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Chapter 3
Ocean Wave Estimation
It is well known that the optimal control that maximizes the power absorbed by a wave energy
converter (WEC) is future-dependent (non-causal). In most cases, this means that in order to
enhance the eciency of energy conversion, the system controlling the WEC ought to be guided
by estimates of the impending time waveforms of the ocean waves. In fact, there are several
control strategies, described in [32,77,78], which have shown that through relying on estimates of
future waves, delivered just a few seconds ahead, it is possible to achieve a twofold increase in the
conversion eciency of WEC devices. Additionally, more recent work on novel control strategies
of WEC devices, for example the work in [33,34], has continued to rely on the use of estimates for
future ocean waves.
The idea of using (short-term) estimates of future waves for enhanced WEC eciency was
originally suggested by the authors of [79, 80]. The work in [81] provided experimental results
demonstrating the possible benets of using sensors for the estimation of ocean waves. The same
work also described some heuristic measures for obtaining better predictions but those measures
did not account for noise in the measurements and errors in the predictions. Requirements for the
provided estimates (or predictions) and how they change in relation to a device's hydrodynamic
properties were studied in [82]. Some of the more recent work on ocean wave estimation, like that
in [83,84], proposed adopting purely stochastic univariate time series solutions where predictions of
wave elevation at a certain point are generated based solely on past measurements of the same type
at that same location. While this approach has its benets, stemming mainly from its adoption
of simplied models that do not require estimating the directionality of the waves, it may suer
from some drawbacks. One such drawback is that whenever an estimate is produced, a univariate
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and purely stochastic time series approach will discard any valuable information contained in
measurements collected at other nearby locations which, if properly employed, may lead to more
accurate estimates. Also, such an a approach is unable to provide any information regarding the
directionality of the waves, which could become important when several WECs are operating in a
farm.
In this chapter, we consider an alternate approach of having a network of spatially distributed
sensors where all their measurements are fused together to create a spatial and temporal description
of the wave surface surrounding the sensors and the WEC devices. Having a full description of
the wave surface means that we are able to provide estimates pertaining to locations that are
possibly dierent from the locations of the sensors. Another advantage of using this approach is
that the number of sensors in the network is no longer related to the number of WEC devices or
the number of locations at which the estimates are needed. Therefore, we may employ a number of
sensors that is larger than the number of WECs in order to collect a larger number of time samples,
obtained within the same amount of time, and hence produce more accurate predictions. Thus,
for robustness under failures, it may suce to have a few extra sensors in the network that allow
us to produce accurate estimates even if a small number of sensors in the network fail over time
whereas univariate time series approaches would require each sensor to have its own backup. Since
the approach we consider has the potential to provide more information about the ocean surface, it
does suer from having a fairly more complex wave model and is typically associated with relatively
higher upfront costs when compared to the other method. However, because our approach has
the potential to provide very valuable information that is especially useful for novel WEC control
methods, we believe that studying this approach, where a lot of work remains to be explored and
completed, is of great interest from both research and practical prospectives. The authors of [85]
and [86] also considered employing a network of spatially distributed sensors but their work was
purely deterministic and did not account for noise in the sesnors' measurements. As a result, the
performance of the lters designed in [85] and [86] under noisy measurements is not known as they
have not been compared to any bounds on performance including the Cramer-Rao Bound (CRB)
which, as demonstrated by our numerical results, is shown to be nearly achievable. It is worth
mentioning that the resulting wave models under our approach involve many complexities that we
do not claim to have solved or completely answered and that, through the work presented here,
we rather aim to contribute to the advancement of the work attempting to address some of them.
We believe that having the ability to compare approaches relying on measurements from spatially
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distributed sensors to those employing univariate time series approaches is of great value and that
much remains to be understood about the performance-cost trade-os that exist between the two
methods. A necessary rst step towards that comparison is to develop an accurate estimation
approach under an array-based model which we present in this chapter.
The presented work derives general expressions for the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) and the
CRB. The CRB tightly bounds the smallest mean square error (MSE) of any unbiased estimation
approach. This is the rst work to provide closed form expressions providing a bound on the
accuracy of the estimation for the problem of estimating ocean waves. These expressions are
general in the sense that the set of collected measurements is not restricted to originating from a
single type of sensor, elevation or acceleration for example, as it allows the measurements to be a
mixture of any number of types from a given set of possible sensor types. In the chapter, we also
present a low-complexity method for the parametric estimation of the quantity of interest (elevation
for example) and provide numerical results highlighting the accuracy of the method. Although
our method is suboptimal, its performance seems to come very close to the CRB for almost all the
cases we considered under the assumptions specied in this chapter. Moreover, as shown by the
numerical results presented in this chapter, the suggested method has a running time that greatly
improves on that of more conventional methods typically employed for solving problems similar to
the one addressed in this chapter. All the work in this chapter is conducted while describing the
ocean as a sum of incident plane waves, each parameterized by amplitude, frequency, direction,
and phase. Such a wave model is obtained under stated uid mechanics assumptions and the
assumption that the sensors employed to collect the measurements are suciently small to have
no eect on the wave eld.
In the following section the wave model used to describe the sensor measurements is formally
introduced. Section 3.2 describes the CRB and includes all the general equations for calculating the
FIM and the CRB under noisy observations. In Section 3.3, we present our estimation approach
and describe several key ideas regarding its operation. Section 3.4 presents numerical examples
demonstrating the performance of our proposed approach relative to the CRB. In Section 3.5, we
propose a method to quantify the loss in mean absorbed power by WEC devices due to errors in
estimation. Finally, Section 3.6 summarizes our results and concludes the work presented in this
chapter.
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3.1 Ocean Wave Model
For our analysis involving the plane waves, we use the well accepted standard wave equation
model from [24] where we assume the ocean is an ideal incompressible uid with no loss of me-
chanical energy. We also adopt the common assumptions that the uid motion is irrotational and
that the wave amplitudes are small enough so that linear theory is applicable. Moreover, the de-
ployment area in the ocean is assumed to be of sucient depth such that nite depth eects, other
than dispersion, are small. Finally, we assume that the incident waves were created by forcing
functions, distant storms for example, that were applied at sucient distances away resulting in
the observation of fully developed ocean waves. These assumptions are used extensively in the
area of control for ocean WEC devices and are generally well accepted. Under the just described
assumptions, a measurement of any of the quantities identied in Table 3.1 made at any location
(x; y)T in the two-dimensional incident eld and any time t of interest is described by the general
expression1
 (x; y; t;) =
LX
i=1
MiX
j=1
Ai;jw
a
i cos

(
w2i
g
)x cos(i;j) + (
w2i
g
)y sin(i;j)  twi + i;j   b
2

; (3.1)
which is parameterized by
 =(A1;1; A1;2; : : : ; A1;M1 ; A2;1; : : : ; AL;ML ;
!1; : : : ; !L;
1;1; 1;2; : : : ; 1;M1 ; 2;1; : : : ; L;ML ;
1;1; 1;2; : : : ; 1;M1 ; 2;1; : : : ; L;ML)
T (3.2)
where Ai;j is the amplitude in meters, !j is the frequency in radians per second, i;j is the angular
direction in radians measured relative to the x-axis, i;j is the phase in radians and the following
1While L and Mi; i = 1; : : : ; L are often picked based on experimental investigations by WEC manufacturers
and researchers, there are studies in the signal processing community [87] that suggest methods to optimize these
choices, but we omit such a discussion for brevity and assume Mi i = 1; : : : ; L and L are known here.
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hold true.
0 < Ai;j 8i and 8j; (3.3)
0 < wi 8i; and wi 6= wi0 for i 6= i0; (3.4)
0  i;j < 2 8i and 8j; (3.5)
0  i;j < 2 8i and 8j: (3.6)
The constants `a' and `b' in (3.1) are integer constants whose values are set according to Table 3.1
to determine the quantity under consideration. The quantities provided in Table 3.1 are a subset
of a larger group of possible types of measurements, provided in our preliminary work [88] and [89]
and the work presented here could be easily extended to include the larger set of measurements.
Since the wave eld, given by (3.1), is parameterized by the unknown , given by (3.2), it is by
producing estimates of  that we are able to generate, at any point in space and any time, future
predictions of  (x; y; t;) which could be used for control. While  will slowly change over long
periods of time, it may be assumed to remain constant for few minutes at a time, at least over the
area monitored by the sensors. This assumption was adopted in [78] and [85] and as long as the
values of the parameters are continuously re-estimated several times over far shorter time periods,
this assumption is a reasonable one.
Table 3.1: Integer Constant Values for Selected Predicted Quantities or Sensor Measurements
Sensor Measurement a b
Surface Elevation 0 0
Vertical Surface Velocity 1 1
Vertical Surface Acceleration 2 0
In the next section, we derive general expressions for the FIM and CRB.
3.2 Cramer-Rao Bound
In this section we derive the CRB [90] on the MSE for the prediction, made at location (xp; yp)
T
and time tp, of the value  (xp; yp; tp;) given values for the constants `a' and `b' specied according
to one of the rows from Table 3.1. We consider having a network with N sensors, possibly of
dierent types, each having known position (xr; yr)
T , r = 1; : : : ; N and providing the noisy sensor
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measurements
	(xr; yr; tm) = (xr; yr; tm;) + vr(tm); tm = 0; : : : ; (K   1)Ts (3.7)
where Ts is the sampling period, K is the total number of time samples collected by each sensor,
and vr(tm) represents noise and distortion. The noise in the measurements is meant to capture
errors due to electrical and thermal noise and other random measurement errors in the system
which are bound to exist. For simplicity, assume
(v1(0); : : : ; vN (0); : : : ; v1((K   1)Ts); : : : ; vN ((K   1)Ts))T
is jointly Gaussian with a zero mean vector and a covariance matrix that is diagonal with (21;0; : : : ; 
2
N;K 1)
along the diagonal. Then, the joint probability density function (pdf) of the observations condi-
tioned on , often called the likelihood function, is
f	(	;) =
NY
r=1
K 1Y
k=0
1q
22r;k
exp
 
  	(xr; yr; kTs)   (xr; yr; kTs;)2
22r;k
!
: (3.8)
Let ^ and  ^(xp; yp; tp; ^) be unbiased estimators of  and  (xp; yp; tp;), respectively. Then
by [91, 92] the MSE of the estimator  ^(xp; yp; tp; ^), which is equal to the variance in this case,
must satisfy
var( ^(xp; yp; tp))  q()TJ() 1q(); (3.9)
where the quantity on the right hand side of (3.9) is the CRB which is computed using the vector
q() and the FIM, J(). The vector q() is dened as
q() =q(xp; yp; tp;)
=

@ (xp; yp; tp;)
@1
; : : : ;
@ (xp; yp; tp;)
@3M+L
T
; (3.10)
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where i; i = 1; 2; : : : ; 3M + L is the i
th element in  which was given in (3.2) and M =
LP
i=1
Mi.
The `  nth element of J() is calculated according to [91,92] and is given by
J`;n() = E

@
@`
ln f	(	;)
@
@n
ln f	(	;)

; (3.11)
which is a function of the sensor locations and the sampling times but is not a function of (xp; yp)
T
and tp, the location and time of prediction respectively. The FIM also allows us to obtain the
CRB for the MSE in estimating the elements of  since the MSE for estimating the ith element in
, equal to the variance in this case, must satisfy
var(^i) 

J() 1

i;i
; i = 1; : : : ; 3M + L: (3.12)
We note that (xp; yp)
T is not limited to locations where sensors are available and could be any
location of interest. We also note that, for almost all the considered situations, we did not observe
any signicant dierence between the CRB values at sensor locations and the CRB values at nearby
locations where no measurements (sensors) are available. Under our assumptions about the noise,
(3.11) takes on the general form
J`;n() =
NX
r=1
K 1X
k=0
1
2r;k

@
@`
 (xr; yr; kTs;)

@
@n
 (xr; yr; kTs;)

(3.13)
which is a sum over the product of two derivatives of (3.1) with respect to either amplitude,
direction, frequency or phase depending on the parameters that ` and n correspond to in . We
derived the expressions for these derivatives, and give them below as
@
@Ai;j
(xr; yr; t) = w
ar
i cos

w2i
g
 
xr cos(i;j) + yr sin(i;j)
  twi + i;j   br 
2

; (3.14)
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@@wi
(xr; yr; t) =
MiX
j=1
Ai;jarw
ar 1
i
cos

w2i
g
 
xr cos(i;j) + yr sin(i;j)
  twi + i;j   br 
2

 
Ai;jw
ar
i sin

w2i
g
(xr cos(i;j) + yr sin(i;j))  twi
+ i;j   br 
2

2wi
g
(xrcos(i;j) + yrsin(i;j))  t

(3.15)
@
@i;j
(xr; yr; t) = Ai;jw
ar
i (
w2i
g
)(xr sin(i;j)  yr cos(i;j))
sin

w2i
g
(xr cos(i;j) + yr sin(i;j))  twi + i;j   br 
2

; (3.16)
and
@
@i;j
(xr; yr; t) =  Ai;jwari sin

w2i
g
(xr cos(i;j) + yr sin(i;j))  twi + i;j   br 
2

; (3.17)
where the values of the constants ar and br determine the type of the measurement available at
(xr; yr)
T . A numerical example where the CRB is calculated using the just provided expressions
is given in section 3.4 where we compare the accuracy our proposed estimation approach, which
we present next, to the CRB.
3.3 The Parametric Estimation of Ocean Waves
For this section, we consider the same network setup introduced in Section 3.2 where we have
a network of N distributed sensors with known locations (xr; yr)
T , r = 1; : : : ; N . Since the choice
of the origin is arbitrary, we will assume, with no loss of generality, that (x1; y1) = (0; 0)
T . We
adopt the signal model for the noisy sensor measurements given by (3.7). Further, throughout this
section we assume that2 21;0 =    = 2N;K 1 = 2.
Under the just stated assumptions and before introducing our suggested estimation approach,
let us consider the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator for . The ML estimate ^ML is dened
2The assumption that 21;0 =    = 2N;K 1 = 2 is adopted only to simplify the presentation of our method.
Once the presented method is understood, the extension to the case where it possible that 21;0 6=    6= 2N;K 1 is
fairly straightforward.
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as ^ML = argmax ln(f	(	;)) where L(	;) , ln(f	(	;)) is the natural logarithm of the
likelihood function (3.8), typically called the log-likelihood function, which in our case is given by
L(	;) = ln(22)
 NK
2   1
22
NX
r=1
K 1X
k=0
(	(xr; yr; kTs)   (xr; yr; kTs;))2; (3.18)
and since the rst term in (3.18) does not depend on  and neither does 122 , it can be shown that
the ML estimate ^ML can be described as
^ML = argmin

NX
r=1
K 1X
k=0
(	(xr; yr; kTs)   (xr; yr; kTs;))2; (3.19)
which is the value of  that minimizes the sum of the squared error over all time measurements
and all sensors (least squares t). For a simple convex problem, the ML estimate could be found
using derivatives of the objective function but, unfortunately, the considered problem is non-convex
which hinders the use of such methods due to the existence of local extrema.
We now present our proposed estimation approach in the following subsection.
3.3.1 A Proposed Estimation Approach
Consider the general wave model given in (3.1). If none of the component waves in (3.1) have
the same frequency, then the inner sum in (3.1) would be over only a single value and we would
essentially have a single sum. Now, as an approximation, if we take all the waves in (3.1) that share
the same frequency and just slightly perturb the frequency values for those waves such that the
resulting frequency values are all unique yet very close to the unperturbed value, then we essentially
have a single sum approximation of (3.1). A step-by-step explanation for reducing the double sum
to a single sum is given in the appendix for this chapter. Having the frequencies of all the waves be
dierent provides us with great benets when it comes to the design of the estimation algorithm,
which we present next, and since the frequencies could be made arbitrarily close to their original
value, the amount of loss due to the modeling error can be controlled and driven to be smaller
than any predetermined acceptable value. We believe that such an approximation is reasonable,
especially since the amount of modeling error introduced by this approximation is controllable.
Therefore, using the just described approximation and through re-indexing the parameter values
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in (3.1), we will adopt, as our wave model for the remainder of this chapter, the expression
 (x; y; t;) =
MX
i=1
Aiw
a
i cos

(
w2i
g
)x cos(i) + (
w2i
g
)y sin(i)  twi + i   b
2

; (3.20)
where M =
LP
i=1
Mi and the unknown parameters are
 = (A1; : : : ; AM ; !1; : : : ; !M ; 1; : : : ; M ; 1; : : : ; M )
T : (3.21)
However, to ensure that we are able to correctly estimate the frequencies in (3.20), we will assume
that K, the number of samples from a single sensor, is chosen suciently large such that
jwi   wi0 j > 4
K
8i 6= i0; 1 < i < M; 1 < i0 < M; (3.22)
is satised. The right-hand side in (3.22) is equal to twice the value of what is known as the
frequency or spectral resolution of the employed periodogram [93] approach. Since K is typically
a design variable, there will always exist a choice of K that is suciently large such that (3.22) is
satised and the approximation of (3.1) by (3.20) is suciently accurate. Lastly, since the ordering
of the frequencies !1; : : : ; !M is arbitrary, we will assume, without any loss of generality, that
!1 < !2 <    < !M : (3.23)
Next, we present our proposed estimation method under Algorithm 3.1. The presented
method depends on the subroutines Estimate Frequencies, Linear LS and Find Betas given,
respectively, by Subroutine 3.1, Subroutine 3.2, and Subroutine 3.3. The presented method
employs the function Size which accepts an input vector and then simply returns the size, or
length, of the vector. and the function Sort which takes in an input vector and a sorting mode
(either ascending or descending) and returns as output a sorted version of the input vector as
well as a vector giving the position in the original vector of the now sorted element. The arctan 2
function which is also known as the four quadrant arctan is also employed. We also employ the
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p modulo q operation which is dened as the operation returning a value v such that
p modulo q , v = p  qn; (3.24)
where 0  v < q; n 2 Z; (3.25)
and Z is the set of integer numbers.
Algorithm 3.1: Proposed Estimation Approach - (Partial)
1: Input: Sensor locations (x1; y1)
T and types (ar; br)
T for r = 1; : : : ; N with (x1; y1)
T =
(0; 0)T . Total number of frequencies L. Sampling period Ts. Sensor measurements Yr =
(	(xr; yr; 0); : : : ;	(xr; yr; (K   1)Ts))T ; r = 1; : : : ; N .
2: Output: ^ = (A1; : : : ; AL; !1; : : : ; !L; 1; : : : ; L; 1; : : : ; L)
T
3: Begin
4: for r = 1 to N do
5: W^r;inital = Estimate Frequencies(L; Ts;Yr)
6: end for
7: for i = 1 to L do
8: W^init[i] =
1
N
PN
r=1 W^r;init[i]
9: end for
10: for r = 1 to N do
11: [A^r;init;  ^r;init] = Linear LS(W^intial; ar; br;Yr)
12: end for
13: for i = 1 to L do
14: A^init[i] =
1
N
PN
r=1 A^r;init[i]
15: end for
16: for r = 1 to N do
17: Dene  0r(t;
0
r) =
PL
i=1Ai cos( i;r   wit   br 2 ) where 0r = (A;W; r)T =
(A1; : : : ; AL; w1; : : : ; wL; 1;r; : : : ; L;r).
18: Use local search algorithm with 0r = (A^init;W^init;  ^r;init)
T as initial guess to nd a
new 0r = (A^;W^r;  ^r)
T that minimizes
PK 1
k=0 (	(xr; yr; kTs)   0r(t;0r))2
19: W^r = (w^1; : : : ; w^L)
T = 0r[L+ 1 : 2L]
20: end for
21: for i = 1 to L do
22: W^[i] = 1N
PN
r=1 W^r[i]
23: end for
The presented approach relies on a few key ideas. The rst key idea, utilized in Subroutine 3.1,
is that of obtaining estimates for frequency as those values of w that correspond to the largest L
peaks in the periodogram, which is given by
I(w) =
1
K
K 1X
k=0
	(xr; yr; kTs)e
 jwk
2: (3.26)
This idea is well-studied for estimating frequency and is used in several signal processing problems
[92].
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Algorithm 3.1: Proposed Estimation Approach - Continued
24: for r = 1 to N do
25: [A^r;  ^r] = Linear LS(W^; ar; br;Yr)
26: end for
27: for i = 1 to L do
28: A^[i] = 1N
PN
r=1 A^r[i]
29: end for
30: ^ =  ^1
31: for r = 2 to N do
32: ^r = ( ^r   ^) modulo 2
33: end for
34: for i = 1 to L do
35: Pi = (^2[i]; : : : ; ^N [i])
T
36: W^e;i = (W^[i]; W^ 1[i]; W^ 2[i]; : : : ; W^N [i])
T
37: Bi = Find Betas
 
W^[i];Pi; (x2; y2)
T ; : : : ; (xN ; yN )
T

38: end for
39: Dene  (xr; yr; t;) =
LP
i=1
Aiw
ar
i cos

(
w2i
g )xr cos(i) + (
w2i
g )yr sin(i)  twi + i   br 2

with
 = (A1; : : : ; AL; !1; : : : ; !L; 1; : : : ; L; 1; : : : ; L)
T .
40: possible = (A^;W^;B1[1];B2[1]; : : : ; ;BL[1]; ^)
T
41: for i = 1 to L do
42: for j = 1 to Size(Bi) do
43: possible[2L+ i] = Bi[j]
44: t[i; j] =
NX
r=1
K 1X
k=0
(	(xr; yr; kTs)   (xr; yr; kTs;possible))2
45: end for
46: j = min
j
(fit[i; j])
47: [i] = Bi[j
]
48: end for
49: ^ = (A^;W^;; ^)T
50: (optional) Use local search algorithm with ^ as initial guess to nd a new ^ that minimizesPN
r=1
PK 1
k=0 (	(xr; yr; kTs)   (xr; yr; kTs;possible))2
51: Return ^
The second key idea, utilized in Subroutine 3.2, is based on repeatedly employing the trigono-
metric identity
cos(Pi;r  Qi) = cos(Pi;r) cos(Qi) + sin(Pi;r) sin(Qi); (3.27)
in equation (3.1) with
Pr;i = (
w2i
g
)xr cos(i) + (
w2i
g
)yr sin(i) + i   b
2
; (3.28)
Qi = twi; i = 1; 2; : : : ; L;
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Subroutine 3.1: Estimate Frequencies
1: Input: Total number of frequencies L. Sampling period Ts. Sensor measurements Yr =
(	(xr; yr; 0); : : : ;	(xr; yr; (K   1)Ts))T
2: Output: W^ = (w^1; : : : ; w^L)
T
3: Begin
4: for i = 1 to 1=2Ts do
5: 
[i] = 2(i  1)=(Ts2dlog2(Size(Yr))e)
6: I[i] = 1K
PK 1k=0 	(xr; yr; kTs)exp( j
[i]k)2
7: end for
8: for i = 2 to Size(I)  1 do
9: if I[i] > I[i  1] and I[i] > I[i+ 1] then
10: peak[i  1] = I[i]
11: peak freq[i  1] = 
[i]
12: end if
13: end for
14: [peak sorted,index] = Sort(peak; `descending')
15: for i = 1 to L do
16: W^[i] =peak freq[index[i]]
17: end for
18: [W^, index2] = Sort(W^; `ascending')
19: Return W^
such that the observations from a sensor located at (xr; yr)
T , collected in the vector
Yr = (	(xr; yr; 0); : : : ;	(xr; yr; (K   1)Ts))T ; (3.29)
where 	(xr; yr; kTs) for k = 0; 1; : : : ; (K   1) is dened in (3.7), are described by the linear model
Yr = Hr(r;1;1; r;1;2; : : : ; r;L;1; r;L;2)
T + (vr(0); vr(Ts); : : : ; vr((K   1)Ts))T (3.30)
where the noise terms vr(kTs); k = 0; 1; : : : ; (K 1) are as dened in (3.7), the observation matrix
Hr is obtained according to Step 4 through Step 7 in Subroutine 3.2, and
r;i;1 = Aw
ar
l cos(Pr;i); (3.31)
r;i;2 = Aw
ar
l sin(Pr;i); (3.32)
where Pi;r is given by (3.28). Given this linear model we implement a linear least squares estimator,
which is known to have desirable properties, in Step 8 of Subroutine 3.2.
The third key idea employed in the presented approach is recognizing that the initial estimates
from executing Step 4 through Step 15 of Algorithm 3.1 can be employed as great starting
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Subroutine 3.2: Linear LS
1: Input: Frequency estimates W^ = (w^1; : : : ; w^L)
T , sensor constants ar; br, and sensor measure-
ments Yr
2: Output: A^r = (A^1;r; : : : ; A^L;r)
T and  ^r = ( ^1;r; : : : ;  ^L;r)
T
3: Begin
4: for l = 1 to Size(W^ ) do
5: H^l;r =
26664
cos( br2 ) sin(
br
2 )
cos(!^lTs   br2 ) sin(!^lTs + br2 )
...
...
cos(!^l(K-1)Ts   br2 ) sin(!^l(K-1)Ts + br2 )
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6: end for
7: H^r = [H^1;r H^2;r : : : H^L;r]
8: (^1;1; ^1;2; : : : ; ^L;1; ^L;2)
T = (H^Tr H^r)
 1H^TrYr
9: for l = 1 to Size(W^ ) do
10: A^l;r =
p
(^l;1)2 + (^l;2)2=(w^l)
ar
11:  ^l;r = arctan 2(^l;2; ( 1)br ^l;1) modulo 2
12: end for
13: A^r = (A^1;r; : : : ; A^L;r)
T
14:  ^r = ( ^1;r; : : : ;  ^L;r)
T
15: Return A^r;  ^r
points (guesses) to standard iterative optimization algorithms. Since these starting points are
fairly accurate to begin with, the optimization algorithms will typically converge relatively quickly
and have favorable running times. Safeguards limiting the maximum number of iterations for the
optimization algorithm could be employed in order to limit the total running time of the algorithm
but this might cause losses in the accuracy of the estimates.
The fourth and most important key idea is that used in Subroutine 3.3 which is employed
to facilitate the estimation of the directions i; i = 1; : : : ; L. The problem that Subroutine 3.3
solves stems from the fact that the estimates of  i;r; r = 2; : : : ; N; i = 1; : : : ; L, obtained in
Step 11 and Step 25 of Algorithm 3.1, which contain the information regarding the wave di-
rections are produced through an inverse tangent operation whose range is limited to [ ; ]. Due
to this fact, each of the obtained  i;r's is possibly shifted by some unknown integer multiple of 2
and instead of obtaining estimates of
i;r , (
w2i
g
)x cos(i) + (
w2i
g
)y sin(i) + i; (3.33)
we are obtaining estimates of
 i;r , i;r modulo 2: (3.34)
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Subroutine 3.3: Find Betas
1: Input: Frequency estimate w^ and local frequency estimates w^1; : : : ; w^N , collected into W =
(w^; w^1; : : : ; w^N ) . Vector of phase terms P. Sensor locations (xr; yr)
T ; r = 2; : : : ; N
2: Output: The vector Possible betas
3: Begin
4: L = f0g
5: for r = 2 to N do
6: Lr = fg
7: for i = 1 to N + 1 do
8: nr =

(W [i])2
p
(xr)2+(yr)2
2g

9: for k =  nr to nr do
10: 1 = arccos
  k(2g)
(W [i])2
p
(xr)2+(yr)2

+ arctan 2(yr; xr)
11: Lr = Lr [ (1 modulo 2)
12: Lr = Lr [ ((1   ) modulo 2)
13: end for
14: end for
15: L = L [ Lr
16: end for
17: S = Sort(L; `ascending')
18: R =

(x2 : : : xN )
T ; (y2 : : : yN )
T

19: for j = 1 to Size(S)  1 do
20: 2 = 0:5(S[j] + S[j + 1])
21: for r = 1 to N   1 do
22: Q[r; j] = floor

(w^)2
2g
 
xr cos(2) + yr sin(2)

23: end for
24: end for
25: for j = 1 to Size(S)  1 do
26:

^r;1
^r;2

= (RTR) 1RT
26664
P[1] + 2Q[1; j]
P[2] + 2Q[2; j]
...
P[N -1] + 2Q[N -1; j]
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27: Possible betas[j] = arctan 2(^r;2; ^r;1)
28: end for
29: Return Possible betas
Subroutine 3.3 generates a list of possible combinations of (ni;2; : : : ; ni;N )
T , the number of
integer multiples of 2, that ought to be added to the obtained estimates of  i;r such that
i;r =  i;r+2ni;r; i = 1; : : : ; L; r = 2; : : : ; N . While one might expect the number of possible com-
binations generated to grow exponentially with N , the clever construction of these combinations by
Subroutine 3.3 results in the total number of possible combinations of (ni;2; : : : ; ni;N )
T being at
most 2N2

2

(wi)
2D
2g

+1

which is polynomial in N since D , maxr=2;:::;N
p
(xr)2 + (yr)2. The
great reduction in the number of generated combinations stems from the fact that Subroutine 3.3
takes advantage of knowing the locations of the sensors and judiciously avoids generating combi-
nations of (ni;2; : : : ; ni;N )
T that are not possible under all values of i given the locations of the
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sensors. Since the number of generated combinations is relatively small, and the correct com-
bination lies amongst the generated combinations, the proposed approach tries all the possible
combinations and generates a list of possible values for each i; i = 1; 2; : : : ; L and then, for each
i, chooses the one that results in the best squares t over all sensor measurements and sensors
locations as the estimate of i.
3.4 Discussion and Numerical Results
In this section we present numerical results that demonstrate the estimation accuracy of the
presented approach and also compare its runtime to that of possible global optimization methods.
We rst consider the case of a regular ocean environment and then consider the case where the
ocean environment is described by 3 dierent component waves. We also consider having correlated
noise for a case where the ocean environment is described by 6 components waves.
3.4.1 Estimation Performance: Simple Ocean Environment
In this subsection we consider the simple case where the ocean is described by a single com-
ponent wave. That is, we assume the ocean is given by (3.20) with L = 1 and that the value of
the unknown variable  = (A;w; ; )T is given. For the result presented in Figure 3.1, we set
the value of the unknown variable to  = (0:5; 0:5; 0:5; 0:5)T . We assumed that 8 elevation sensors
were employed in the network and that they were placed, equally spaced along the perimeter, on a
circle of radius equal to 100m and centered at (0; 100)T such that one of the sensors is located at
the origin. Further, we assumed that the sensors will collect their measurements over an interval of
60s starting at time t = 0 and that the variance of the additive noise in the sensors' measurements
is equal to 2 = (0:25)2 for all the sensors. Under the just stated conditions and assumptions, we
employed our estimation method to produce estimates of the unknown variable  as we varied the
sensors' sampling frequency, and hence the total number of samples, in increments of 60Hz, from
60Hz to 300Hz and then increasing the sampling frequency to 500Hz and afterwards to 1000Hz.
For each sampling frequency, we ran a Monte Carlo simulation of 10000 runs where we generated a
new realization of the noise for each run. In Figure 3.1, we include a plot of the obtained MSE for
estimating each element of  and compare it to the CRB for estimating that same element of .
The CRB is obtained according to the expressions and equations derived and presented in Section
3.2. The dierent curves were multiplied by dierent scaling factors, given in the legend of Figure
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3.1, in order to include all the curves in a single gure. From Figure 3.1, we can see that the MSE
obtained using our estimation approach seems to come extremely close to the CRB3.
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Figure 3.1: CRB and MSE curves for estimating  = (0:5; 0:5; 0:5; 0:5)T
3.4.2 Estimation Performance: Three Component Waves
For this subsection, we consider the case where the ocean environment is described by 3 dierent
component waves. This means that we have L = 3 in (3.20) and that our unknown variable is
given by
 = (A1; A2; A3; w1; w2; w3; 1; 2; 3; 1; 2; 3)
T : (3.35)
Using the same sensor types, sensor layouts, and the same noise variance as those assumed in the
previous subsection and only changing the length of the interval over which the measurements are
collected to 30s, starting at t = 0, we generated 100 dierent random ocean environments with
L = 3 where the amplitudes were chosen uniformly randomly over a range from 0:5  2m and the
directions and phases were each chosen uniformly randomly over the full range of 0 2. Since the
frequencies must be suciently far apart, w1 was chosen uniformly randomly from 0:5 1rad=s, w2
was chosen uniformly randomly from 2   2:5rad=s, and w3 was chosen uniformly randomly from
3:5 4rad=s. To obtain our numerical results, we employed our presented estimation method under
sampling frequencies that were increased in increments of 200Hz from 100Hz to 1100HZ. For each
3While the provided results are for a single possible value of the unknown parameter , we attempted a very
large number of dierent and random values for  and in every attempted case, the obtained results were essentially
identical to the ones presented here.
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sampling frequency and for each of the 100 ocean environments, we ran a Monte Carlo simulation
of 300 runs where we generated a new realization of the noise for each run. Afterwards, for every
sampling frequency and every environment, the MSE for each component of the unknown variable
, given in (3.35), was obtained and compared to the CRB, calculated according to the expressions
derived in Section 3.2. Then, for each of the considered ocean environments, we obtained curves
of MSE and CRB similar to those presented in Figure 3.1. Since the number of such curves is very
large, and although the curves were generally very similar to each other and to those in Figure
3.1, we decided to rank the curves according to the sum of the percentage dierence between
the MSE and CRB values at each of the considered sampling frequencies and present some of
the worst scoring curves for the dierent types of parameters in . In Figure 3.2 we present the
worst scoring MSE curves, on a logarithmic scale, for estimating A1; w2; 3; and 1 over the 100
considered ocean environments along with the CRB associated with estimating that parameter for
the ocean environment returning the worst score for that parameter.
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Figure 3.2: Worst scoring MSE curves according to the sum of percentage dierence between MSE
curve and associated CRB curve, which is also included
From Figure 3.2, we can see that even the worst scoring MSE curves came very close to the
CRB which highlights the great accuracy we were continually able to achieve with our presented
estimation approach not just under regular wave environments but also under complex, irregular
wave environments. It is important to note that the presented results are numerical and while
we have not been able to generate cases where the presented estimation approach fails to produce
accurate estimates, this does not provide a mathematical or analytical guarantee regarding the
performance of the estimation approach over the entire space of the unknown variables.
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In the following subsection, we consider an even more complicated wave environment containing
6 component waves and where the noise in the measurements is correlated.
3.4.3 Estimation Performance: Six Component Waves and Correlated
Noise
To further demonstrate the accuracy of the presented approach, in this subsection we consider
an ocean environment that could be regarded as more realistic under the presence of wind waves
and other real-world conditions. The considered environment was chosen to have L = 6 component
waves. Since ocean environments are sometimes decomposed into wave systems where waves from
any given system all travel in the same direction, the rst three component waves were chosen to all
have the same wave direction of =4 and the last three components were chosen to all have the same
wave direction of 2=3. The amplitudes were all chosen uniformly randomly over 0:5  1:5m and
the phases were all chosen uniformly randomly over the full range of 0  2. Further, we assumed
the rst three components waves had frequencies of w1 = 0:25rads=s; w2 = 0:5rads=s; and w3 =
0:75rads=s and we assumed the last three component waves had w4 = 1:25rads=s; w5 = 1:5rads=s;
and w6 = 1:75rads=s as their frequencies. It is also assumed that we employ the same sensor types,
number, and layouts outlined earlier and we consider the case where the sensor measurements are
collected over an interval of 60s starting at time t = 0 and at a sampling frequency of 200Hz.
As for the noise, we compared the performance of our algorithm under both correlated and
uncorrelated noise. For the uncorrelated case, we assumed the noise is Gaussian with zero mean
and a variance of 2 = 0:2m2. For the correlated case we assumed that, at each time interval, the
noise in the measurements collected by the eight sensors in the system is jointly Gaussian with
zero mean and a covariance matrix given by
 =
2666666666666666666664
2 4 6 8 10 8 6 4
4 2 4 6 8 10 8 6
6 4 2 4 6 8 10 8
8 6 4 2 4 6 8 10
10 8 6 4 2 4 6 8
8 10 8 6 4 2 4 6
6 8 10 8 6 4 2 4
4 6 8 10 8 6 4 2
3777777777777777777775
; (3.36)
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where we assume that the correlation decreases as the distance between the sensors increases
which is a typical method of modeling correlation between sensors in a network. Similar to the
uncorrelated case, we assumed that 2 = 0:2m2 in this case as well.
Table 3.2 summarizes the results obtained under the just described conditions and assumptions.
In Table 3.2, we provide the values for each of the 24 variables describing the assumed environment
with six component waves, the CRB value associated with estimating each of the 24 variables
assuming the noise is uncorrelated, and the MSE values obtained using our presented estimation
approach both with and without correlation in the noise. The MSE values were obtained by
averaging the results over 1000 Monte Carlo runs where each run generated a new realization of
the correlated and uncorrelated noise.
Table 3.2: Comparing MSE values obtained using the presented algorithm with correlated and
uncorrelated noise
Unkown True CRB MSE with MSE with
Value uncorr. noise corr. noise
A1 1.282 4.181e-06 3.996e-06 5.167e-06
A2 1.412 4.179e-06 4.186e-06 4.413e-06
A3 0.940 4.171e-06 4.174e-06 3.970e-06
A4 0.960 4.171e-06 4.220e-06 4.382e-06
A5 0.787 4.176e-06 4.250e-06 4.597e-06
A6 1.055 4.164e-06 4.396e-06 4.219e-06
w1 0.250 8.162e-09 8.076e-09 1.186e-08
w2 0.500 6.020e-09 6.177e-09 6.330e-09
w3 0.750 1.160e-08 1.191e-08 1.089e-08
w4 1.250 7.314e-09 7.448e-09 7.417e-09
w5 1.500 8.795e-09 8.893e-09 8.953e-09
w6 1.750 4.048e-09 4.128e-09 4.248e-09
1 0.785 1.249e-05 1.260e-05 1.561e-05
2 0.785 6.440e-07 6.826e-07 6.835e-07
3 0.785 2.893e-07 2.818e-07 2.835e-07
4 2.094 3.594e-08 3.616e-08 3.691e-08
5 2.094 2.578e-08 2.578e-08 2.748e-08
6 2.094 7.751e-09 7.714e-09 8.197e-09
1 5.598 1.367e-05 1.372e-05 1.941e-05
2 3.605 1.259e-05 1.308e-05 1.306e-05
3 4.605 2.882e-05 2.909e-05 2.693e-05
4 1.654 1.360e-05 1.375e-05 1.500e-05
5 4.191 1.896e-05 1.806e-05 1.907e-05
6 5.940 1.004e-05 1.005e-05 1.113e-05
As seen from Table 3.2, the presented approach seems to work very well relative to the CRB
even under correlated noise. Further, the results from Table 3.2 seem to support results from the
previous subsection suggesting that the presented approach works well under complicated wave
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environments described by multiple component waves. We also note that a noise variance equal to
2 = 0:2m2 is considered a relatively very large value especially that the largest amplitude among
all component waves was A1 = 1:282m so our results seem to suggest that the presented approach
is able to perform at near optimal accuracy even under very large, and possibly correlated, noise
values.
Next, we present numerical results involving the runtime of our presented estimation approach.
3.4.4 Runtime Performance
In this subsection, we compare the runtime of the presented estimation approach to that of
a Genetic Algorithm (GA) and a Particle Swarm Optimizer (PSO) which are well-known global
optimization techniques that, similar to the presented approach, do not require an initial guess for
the unknown variable . For the presented results, we used a population size of 100 for both GA
and PSO. Included in Figure 3.3 are curves for the average runtime of the three dierent estimation
methods obtained while assuming the ocean is described by a single component wave (L = 1). The
same sensor types, sensor layouts, and noise variance assumed in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 are
employed and it also assumed that the sensors collect their measurements over an interval of
60s starting at time t = 0. In Figure 3.3, at each of the considered sampling frequencies, 100
dierent values of  = (A;w; ; )T were generated uniformly randomly such that the amplitude
is between 0:5   1:5m, the frequency is between 0:2   0:7rads=s, and both the  and  where
between 0   2. Due to the complexity of the estimation problem, and although the selected
population size for both GA and PSO is relatively large, our best recorded percentages for having
the estimates produced by the algorithms fall within 2:5% of their correct values over all the
considered sampling frequencies were 94% for GA and 95% for PSO while the estimation approach
presented here produced estimates that fell within the 2:5% threshold 100% of the time. As a
result, the running times for both GA and PSO in Figure 3.3 are averaged over only the cases
where the algorithms were able to produce estimates that fell within the 2:5% range around the
the correct value. However, if we did include the cases where the algorithms produced poor results
(outside of the 2:5% threshold), the results would have been almost identical as the times were
almost the same regardless of whether the algorithms converged to estimates inside or outside the
2:5% threshold. Also, we note that in all the considered cases, both GA and PSO terminated due
to convergence to a local minimum and not due to reaching the maximum number of iterations or
the maximum allowable running time so the cases where they produced poor estimates most likely
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resulted from converging to poor local minimums. From Figure 3.3, we can see that the presented
estimation approach clearly outperforms both GA and PSO in terms of runtime performance as
the number of observations is increased by increasing the sampling frequency.
We attempted to obtain a similar gure for cases where the ocean surface is described by
multiple component waves (L 6= 1), but we were unable to obtain any results where either GA or
PSO were able to produce estimates within the 2:5% range for at least 90% of the cases while
maintaining a runtime of less than 120s. In comparison, the runtime of our presented approach
was consistently less than 20s over all attempted cases and it was again able to produce the correct
estimate values 100% of the time.
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Figure 3.3: Average runtime of presented method in comparison with GA and PSO.
In the next section, we consider the impact of estimation errors on the amount of loss in the
power absorbed by WEC devices.
3.5 Power Loss Due to Estimation Errors
Throughout this section, we assume that the ocean is described by a single component wave
(L=1). We also focus on measurements of wave elevation which are given by setting the values of
`a' and `b' according to the rst row of Table 3.1 such that (x; y; t) is given by
(x; y; t) = A cos

(
w2
g
)x cos() + (
w2
g
)y sin()  tw+

; (3.37)
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since the provided analysis can be easily applied to the remaining measurements given in Table
3.1.
From the work by Evans [94] and Falnes [95], we know that the mean (mechanical) power
absorbed by N devices under monochromatic, plane incident waves is given by
P =
1
4
(UHF+ FHU)  1
2
UHBU; (3.38)
where U is the column vector of complex velocity amplitudes, F is the column vector of exciting
forces, B is the matrix of (real) damping coecients, and ()H denotes the Hermitian transpose.
The expression for power given by (3.38) may be maximized such that the maximummean absorbed
power is
Pmax =
1
8
FHB 1F; (3.39)
which is achieved when the vector of complex velocity amplitudes, U, is set to
Uoptimal =
1
2
B 1F; (3.40)
where we assume that B 1 exists.
From the literature on hydrodynamics [24], the wave elevation is related to the excitation force
acting on device r = 1; 2; : : : N located at (xr; yr)
T through
fext(xr; yr; t) =
1Z
 1
hext(t  )(xr; yr; t)d; (3.41)
where fext is the excitation force in Newtons, hext(t) is the excitation impulse response function,
and (x; y; t) is the wave elevation in meters. Assuming that (x; y; t) is given by (3.37), the
excitation force from monochromatic, plane incident waves can be expressed as
fext(xr; yr; t) = AjHext(w)j cos

(
w2
g
)x cos() + (
w2
g
)y sin()  tw++ \Hext(w)

; (3.42)
where Hext(w) = Ffhext(t)g is the excitation force transfer function and Ffg denotes the Fourier
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transform. Thus, the excitation force has a complex (phasor) given by
F (xr; yr) = AjHext(w)j exp(j); (3.43)
where  = (w
2
g )
 
xr
yr
  cos()
sin()

++\Hext(w). To be able to use the power equation given in (3.38),
we will assume that the value of w is known exactly. This will cause our errors to be slightly
underestimated. However, in practice, we have found that one can obtain an estimate of w that
is much more accurate than the other parameters so this is not an unreasonable assumption. As
a result, our task of estimating the complex amplitude of the excitation force in order to set our
control such that the velocity of the WEC is set to satisfy (3.40) becomes the task of estimating the
value of the  = (A; ; )T using an estimator ^ based on collected measurements. Note that (3.40)
describes a control law that is optimal when the complex excitation force is known exactly so due
to errors from estimating the excitation force, the resulting control will actually be sub-optimal
and cause a drop in the average absorbed power.
Since we assume that the collected measurements contain a random component due to noise, the
values of ^ obtained from dierent sets of measurements collected under the same wave conditions
will be slightly dierent from set to set because the realized values of the noise will not be exactly
the same from one set to the other. Thus, it is possible to have a set of measurements that results
in a very accurate value for ^ which causes only a small loss in the power but it also possible that
we collect a set of measurements that happens to be corrupted by noise such that the value of ^ is
not as accurate, causing a larger loss in the absorbed power. In order to handle this variability in
the amount of power lost, we use the statistical description of ^ in order to calculate the expected
value for the loss which provides us with an indication of the amount of power lost on average.
Given a certain realization (value) for ^ , the predicted value of the complex amplitude of the
excitation force at device r = 1; 2; : : : ; N will be
F^ (xr; yr) = A^jHext(w)j exp(j^); (3.44)
where ^ = (w
2
g )
 
xr
yr
 cos(^)
sin(^)

+^+\Hext(w), and we can use this value to set the velocity amplitude
according to (3.40) as
U^ =
1
2
B 1F^; (3.45)
50
where F^ = (F^ (x1; y1); : : : ; F^ (xN ; yN ))
T . As a result, the average power absorbed given an estimate
^, according to (3.38), will be given by
Pest(^) =
1
4
(U^
H
F+ FHU^)  1
2
U^
H
BU^;
=
1
8
((B 1F^)HF+ FH(B 1F^))  1
8
(B 1F^)HB(B 1F^);
=
1
8
(F^
H
B 1F+ FHB 1F^)  1
8
F^
H
B 1F^; (3.46)
and this is a random quantity depending on the value of ^ which is a random variable due to the
noise added to the sensor measurements used for the estimation. If the probability distribution for
^ is given, we can proceed to calculate the expected value of Pest(^) under the given distribution. If
not, we will assume that the distribution for ^ is a multivariate normal with mean  and covariance
matrix equal to the Cramer Rao Bound matrix (inverse of the FIM) as justied in [92, 96]. This
assumes the performance of the estimator is optimal and should therefore provide a lower bound on
the loss in power. The FIM for this problem was derived in Section 3.2. After nding the expected
value for Pest(^), we can divide that number by Pmax which is given by (3.39) to determine the
percentage of the maximum power that we expect to absorb under losses due errors in estimation.
In the next section, we present a numerical example where the just presented ideas and equa-
tions are employed.
3.5.1 Numerical Example: Power loss for a single device in isolation
Consider the case where we have a single device in isolation. Assuming the excitation force
acting on the device is given by (3.43), the power absorbed by N devices given the estimate ^ is
given by (3.46) and, for a single device, it simplies to
Pest(^) =
A^A
4B
cos(   ^)  (A^)
2
8B
: (3.47)
For this numerical example, we assume that the WEC is a heaving vertical cylinder having a radius
of 5m and a length of 20m. Also, we assume that the true value of  = (A;B; )T is given by
 = (1; 1; 1)T and that w is known to be equal to unity. The values for the damping coecient B
and the excitation force transfer function are obtained using WAMIT R [97] assuming the device
is placed in an ocean of innite depth. Further, we assume that the WEC is surrounded by 4 wave
elevation sensors that have been placed, along the major axes, on a circle of radius 100m. The
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measurements collected by the sensors are assumed to be described by
(tm; xl; yl) = (tm; xl; yl) + vl(tm);
tm = Ts; : : : ;KTs; l = 1; : : : ; 4 (3.48)
where Ts is the sampling period, K is the total number of time samples, vl(tm) is noise, (xl; yl) is
the location of the lth sensor, and  is given in (3.37). For simplicity, we assume
(v1(Ts); : : : ; vN (Ts); : : : ; v1(KTs); : : : ; vN (KTs))
T
is jointly Gaussian with zero mean vector and covariance matrix which is diagonal with (21 ; : : : ; 
2
NK)
along the diagonal and 2 = 21 = : : : = 
2
NK = 1. The distribution of the employed estimator ^ is
taken to be a multivariate normal distribution with mean equal to  and a covariance matrix equal
to the CRB matrix (inverse of the FIM). To quantify the power loss, we calculate the percentage
of the power absorbed while accounting for estimation errors relative to the maximum power as
given in (3.39) as
Prel =
E(Pest(^))
Pmax
=
1R
 1
1R
 1
1R
 1
Pest(^)f(^)dA^d^d^
Pmax
; (3.49)
where f(^) is the probability density function of ^. Figure 3.4 includes a plot of the value for Prel
as we varied the total sampling time KTs for dierent sampling frequencies, where the values of the
Prel we obtained through numerically approximating the triple integral in (3.49). Figure 3.4 shows
that increasing both quantities decreases the power loss due to errors in estimation. Figure 3.4
also shows that increasing the sampling frequency and the sampling time will eventually provide
diminishing returns with respect to the gain in absorbed power, which should be expected.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated the parametric estimation of spatial and temporal ocean wave-
forms using a network of spatially distributed ocean sensors whose measurements are corrupted by
additive white Gaussian noise. We derived and presented, for the rst time, the CRB associated
with the estimation of wave properties critically important to novel control strategies. The pre-
sented CRB expressions are general in that they allow for employing any combination of types of
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Figure 3.4: Expected power loss vs sampling time for dierent sampling frequency
measurements from a given set of possible ocean measurements. We also presented a suboptimal
estimation approach that works to overcome possible problems associated with the non-convexity
of the estimation problem and the existence of many local extrema in the objective function. We
provided numerical results that demonstrate the near optimal accuracy of the presented approach
under dierent ocean environments and also its superior runtime performance in comparison to
that of reasonable possible alternative approaches. Finally, we introduced a method that quanties
the loss in the average absorbed power due to errors in estimating the elevation of the waves that
are incident on a single WEC in isolation or multiple WECs in a farm. The devices are assumed
to be controlled such that their velocity would be optimal had the estimates been exactly correct.
A lower bound on the expected loss in the average absorbed power was be obtained by relying on
the CRB of the estimates and a numerical example considering the case where a heaving cylindri-
cal WEC is controlled optimally based on measurements collected from four sensors surrounding
the device was presented. Results giving the percentage of the expected absorbed power under
estimation errors relative to the maximum possible absorbed power by the device were obtained
for dierent values of total sampling time and sampling frequency. The results clearly showed that
the loss in power could be very signicant if the values of the total sampling time or the sampling
frequency were chosen to be too small while also showing that there are diminishing returns when
increasing either variable in order to recover the otherwise lost power.
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3.7 Appendix
A Method for Reducing the Double Sum to a Single Sum
Suppose we adopt
 (x; y; t;) =
LX
i=1
MiX
j=1
Ai;jw
a
i cos

(
w2i
g
)x cos(i;j) + (
w2i
g
)y sin(i;j)  twi + i;j   b
2

; (3.50)
as our wave model. Then, the unknown parameters would be given by
 =(A1;1; A1;2; : : : ; A1;M1 ; A2;1; : : : ; AL;ML ;
!1; : : : ; !L;
1;1; 1;2; : : : ; 1;M1 ; 2;1; : : : ; L;ML ;
1;1; 1;2; : : : ; 1;M1 ; 2;1; : : : ; L;ML)
T : (3.51)
Now, for each j in (3.50), slightly perturb the value of wi to wi;j , wi + j where j 6= j0 for
j 6= j0 and let (x; y; t;s) denote the resulting wave model after the change in the values of wi to
wi;j . Then, we have that
(x; y; t;s) =
LX
i=1
MiX
j=1
Ai;j(wi;j)
a cos

(
w2i;j
g
)x cos(i;j)
+ (
w2i;j
g
)y sin(i;j)  wi;jt+ i;j   b
2

; (3.52)
which now has all the parameters inside the double sum indexed over both i and j, and thus can
be written as the single sum
(x; y; t;s) =
MX
k=1
Akw
a
k cos

(
w2k
g
)x cos(k) + (
wki
g
)y sin(k)  twk + k   b
2

; (3.53)
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where M =
LP
i=1
Mi and Ak; k; wk; and k are obtained by relabeling the Ai;j values, according to
New Label  Old Label
Ak  Ai;j
A1  A1;1
A2  A1;2 ;
...
...
AM1  A1;M1 ;
AM1+1  A2;1;
AM1+2  A2;2;
...
...
AM1+M2  A2;M2
AM1+M2+1  A3;1
...
...
AM  AL;ML
; (3.54)
and then following the same exact scheme to relabel wk  wi;j , k  i;j , k  i;j . Note that
the vector of unknown parameters is now given by
s =(A1; A2; : : : ; AM ;
!1; !2; : : : ; wM
1; 2; : : : ; M ;
1; 2; : : : ; M )
T ; (3.55)
rather than (3.51).
As an example, suppose we start with the (double sum) wave model given by (3.52) with L = 2,
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M1 = 2;M2 = 3, and
 =(A1;1; A1;2; A2;1; A2;2; A2;3;
!1;1; !1;2; !2;1; !2;2; !2;3
1;1; 1;2; 2;1; 2;2; 2;3;
1;1; 1;2; 2;1; 2;2; 2;3)
T : (3.56)
Then, we have that
(x; y; t;s) =
LX
i=1
MiX
j=1
(wi;j)
aAi;j cos

(
w2i;j
g
)x cos(i;j) + (
w2i;j
g
)y sin(i;j)  wi;jt+ i;j   b
2

= A1;1(w1;1)
a cos

(
w21;1
g
)x cos(1;1) + (
w21;1
g
)y sin(1;1)  w1;1t+ 1;1   b
2

+A1;2(w1;2)
a cos

(
w21;2
g
)x cos(1;2) + (
w21;2
g
)y sin(1;2)  w1;2t+ 1;2   b
2

+A2;1(w2;1)
a cos

(
w22;1
g
)x cos(2;1) + (
w22;1
g
)y sin(2;1)  w2;1t+ 2;1   b
2

+A2;2(w2;2)
a cos

(
w22;2
g
)x cos(2;2) + (
w22;2
g
)y sin(2;2)  w2;2t+ 2;2   b
2

+A2;3(w2;3)
a cos

(
w22;3
g
)x cos(2;3) + (
w22;3
g
)y sin(2;3)  w2;3t+ 2;3   b
2

; (3.57)
which by applying the relabeling scheme given by (3.54) is equal to
(x; y; t;s) = A1(w1)
a cos

(
w21
g
)x cos(1) + (
w21
g
)y sin(1)  w1t+ 1   b
2

+A2(w2)
a cos

(
w22
g
)x cos(2) + (
w22
g
)y sin(2)  w2t+ 2   b
2

+A3(w3)
a cos

(
w23
g
)x cos(3) + (
w23
g
)y sin(3)  w3t+ 3   b
2

+A4(w4)
a cos

(
w24
g
)x cos(4) + (
w24
g
)y sin(4)  w4t+ 4   b
2

+A5(w5)
a cos

(
w25
g
)x cos(5) + (
w25
g
)y sin(5)  w5t+ 5   b
2

; (3.58)
which can be expressed as the single sum
(x; y; t;s) =
5X
k=1
Akw
a
k cos

(
w2k
g
)x cos(k) + (
wki
g
)y sin(k)  twk + k   b
2

: (3.59)
Since we slightly perturbed the frequency values from (3.50) in order to arrive at the single
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sum model (3.53), it remains to show that the error introduced by our perturbation could be
controlled such that it is always within any given level of tolerable modeling error. To do so, we
now show that there will always exist a choice for the values of j such that the dierence between
(x; y; t;s) and  (x; y; t;) is made suciently small.
For simplicity, suppose we set j = (j   1) where  > 0. Then, we have that
(x; y; t;s) =
LX
i=1
MiX
j=1
(wi + j)
aAi;j
cos

(
w2i
g
)x cos(i;j) + (
w2i
g
)y sin(i;j)  wit+ i;j   b
2
+ (
(j)
2
g
)x cos(i;j) + (
(j)
2
g
)y sin(i;j)  jt

=
LX
i=1
MiX
j=1
(wi + (j   1))aAi;j
cos

(
w2i
g
)x cos(i;j) + (
w2i
g
)y sin(i;j)  wit+ i;j   b
2
+
2(j   1)2
g
x cos(i;j) +
2(j   1)2
g
y sin(i;j)  (j   1)t

: (3.60)
Now, if we consider the limit of (x; y; t;s) as  goes to zero, we get that
lim
!0
(x; y; t;s) =
LX
i=1
MiX
j=1
(wi + 0(j   1))aAi;j
cos

(
w2i
g
)x cos(i;j) + (
w2i
g
)y sin(i;j)  wit+ i;j   b
2
+
02(j   1)2
g
x cos(i;j) +
02(j   1)2
g
y sin(i;j)  0(j   1)t

=
LX
i=1
MiX
j=1
(wi)
aAi;j cos

(
w2i
g
)x cos(i;j)+
(
w2i
g
)y sin(i;j)  wit+ i;j   b
2

=  (x; y; t;): (3.61)
By the denition of limits, this means that given any  > 0, there exists a  > 0 such that
j(x; y; t;s)   (x; y; t;)j < ; (3.62)
which implies that, by choosing an appropriate value of , approximating  (x; y; t;) by (x; y; t;s)
can be made as accurate (within a tolerable approximation error of  > 0) as the user desires.
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Chapter 4
Stochastic Optimal Power Flow
Under Forecast Errors and
Failures in Communication
Nomenclature
G Set of all generators/loads
pi Power produced/demanded by generator/load i 2 G
Ci Per unit cost of power produced/demanded
C i ; C
+
i Per unit cost for negative/positive adjustment in dispatch of generator/load i
kj (k; j)
th entry of the PTDF matrix
tmaxk Power ow limit for power line k
pmini ; p
max
i generation/consumption capacities for generator/load i
pmins;i ; p
max
s;i p
min
i ; p
max
i under scenario s
pno commi Pre-set power generation/consumption under no communication for genera-
tor/load i
S Set of all possible random scenarios
scs Probability that scenario s 2 S will occur
ps;i Change in dispatch for generator/load i under scenario s
  s;i; 
+
s;i Under/over dispatch of generator/load i under scenario s
D i ; D
+
i Per unit cost for under/over utilization of generator/load i under scenario s
C Set of all nodes in the communication network
Bi;j Cost of leasing a comm. link between nodes i and j
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Owing to the great size of most electric grids, data collected from sensors is typically trans-
mitted to the grid operator using a communication network. The communication network is also
responsible for sending control signals from the system operator to loads and generators in the
power grid. In many cases, the control signals represent corrective re-dispatch commands based on
the data collected from the sensors in the power grid. As a result, communication failures between
the grid and the system operator could aect the ability to correct or control the dispatch level of
a load or generator.
We consider the case where the system operator initially dispatches the loads and generators
based on the forecasts for their capacities and then relies on sensors and the communication net-
work to obtaining the actual load and generator capacities. Based on the measured capacities, the
operator may decide to issue re-dispatch commands which must be carried to the communication
network to the required load or generator. Facilitating the communication of the measured capaci-
ties and re-dispatch commands is a communication network whose links are susceptible to random
failures.
We focus on identifying the optimal communication network topology and the optimal choice
for dispatch and re-dispatch actions while accounting for forecasting errors and failures in com-
munication. Our problem is formulated as a stochastic optimal power ow (OPF) problem where
the objective is to minimize the average overall economic cost of the system under a large set
of constraints representing the dierent stochastic scenarios we consider. While our study is on
optimal power ow (OPF) problems, the underlying framework and analysis we employ could be
easily extended to investigate the eect of failures and forecast errors on other important grid
operations like unit commitment and economic dispatch for example. OPF problems sit at the
core of many modern day power markets and operations with dierent variations of the problem
solved several times a day at varying intervals that range from every hour to, in some cases, every
ve minutes. In general, OPF problems seek to minimize the cost of balancing power demand
and generation while satisfying various physical and operational constraints relating to generation
limits, electric line capacities and laws governing the ow of electricity. The generality of OPF
allows the presented work to be extended to other market operations and problems as they will
mostly involve the same or very similar constraints and considerations. Throughout this chapter,
we employ the well known direct current (DC) approximation for power networks [98] to formulate
our DC OPF problems that we simply refer to as OPF problems.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our problem
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setup and discuss the stochastic scenarios we consider. In section 4.2, we formulate our stochastic
OPF problem and provide details on modeling communication failures and their eect on the
system. Section 4.3 presents several numerical results obtained using our presented model. Finally,
Section 4.4 summarizes the main ndings presented in this chapter.
4.1 Model Setup and Description
We consider a stochastic, two-settlement, OPF problem for a power grid whose operation is
supported by a communication network having a topology this chosen by the system operator as
a rst-settlement decision. In the rst settlement, the system operator must rely on stochastic
forecasts for the generation capacity of the system's renewable energy sources and the demand
capacities of the system's loads which are all assumed to be controllable. Also included in the rst
settlement is the system operator's decision on the communication topology leased (activated) in
anticipation of the dierent possible failures that some of the links might experience in between
the two settlements. The stochastic events occurring between the two settlements are due to three
factors:
 Errors in forecasting renewable generation capacity,
 Errors in forecasting load capacities (demands),
 Failures in the communication network.
The second settlement takes place after the actual capacity values are realized and the failure-prone
communication network is employed to transmit the updated capacity values to the control center.
The delivery of the actual capacity values to the control center is not guaranteed since the random
link failures may result in having no active communication path connecting the control center to
the sensor measuring a certain capacity.
We model the forecasts for renewable capacity and their errors by a discrete probability mass
function (pmf) where the most likely outcome represents the forecast value and the remaining
outcomes represent the possible realized capacity values above or below the forecast. We let
Nrenewlevels denote the number of possible capacity values the renewable source could take including
its forecast. Similarly, we assume forecasts and errors in load capacities are also modeled by a
discrete pmf with N loadlevels levels with the most probable level taken as the forecast. Capacity
forecasts are typically based on historical user data, weather conditions, and other seasonal trends
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which are all impossible to predict or forecast with perfect accuracy so uctuations in capacities
around their forecasts will always exist especially for intermittent renewable resources like wind
and solar energy.
Failures in the communication network are modeled as a loss in any number of links from the
graph describing the communication network. Failures in communication links are assumed to
be independent and we model the failure of any given link by a Bernoulli random variable with
probability oncomm such that the link fails with probability 1 oncomm. For a real network, dierent
communication links may be more likely to fail than others since the network may include dierent
communication technologies or links having dierent characteristics. Further, the assumption of
independent link failures may be inaccurate if a failure occurs due to severe weather conditions
aecting links in a certain area of the network or if the failures are due to a complex cyber
attack aecting multiples links at the same time. More complex probability models allowing
communication links to have dierent failure probabilities or accounting for correlated link failures
may be employed and should apply directly to our presented problem.
The number of possible link failures grows exponentially with Nnodes the number of nodes
in the communication network since a network with Nnodes nodes could have up to Nlinks ,
Nnodes(Nnodes 1)
2 communication links and since each of those links is subject to failure, the total
number of failure scenarios is N commscenarios = 2
Nlinks .
Throughout this chapter, we assume that the pmfs describing load forecasts share the same
N loadlevels and that if the i
th level is observed for a given load, the observed capacity for every load
will be the one represented by the ith capacity level. This assumption is meant to simplify our
analysis by having a smaller number of possible scenarios and it may be removed in exchange for
an increase in the computational complexity of the analysis. To further simplify our analysis, we
also assume that only one generator in the grid is a renewable energy source and this assumption
may also be removed in exchange for an increase in computational complexity.
Taken together, the three factors contributing to the stochasticity in the system may be used
to index S the set of all possible random scenarios where elements of S may be given as a tuple
(a; b; c) where A 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Nrenewlevels g;B 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N loadlevelsg; C 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N commscenariosg such that
jSj = Nrenewlevels N loadlevelsN commscenarios. We may also use s 2 S as a general element of S to simplify the
presentation when appropriate. We note that given a suciently robust communication network,
the connectivity between sensor nodes and the control center could be maintained even under
cases where many communication links have failed. For example, in Figure 4.1, all the sensor
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nodes remain connected to the control center although ve of the nine communication links have
failed or are inactive. Next, we present our OPF formulation and we formally describe the eect
of communication failures on the power grid.
Figure 4.1: System Diagram for a communication network supporting a 9-bus system while having
5 failed links
4.2 Stochastic OPF Problem Formulation
In the stochastic DC OPF problem we consider, decision variables go beyond choosing dispatch
levels for the loads and power generators as they include an added set of variables relating to the
leased topology of the communication network. The optimal decisions are chosen to minimize the
total expected cost for operating the power system while accounting for the dierent scenarios
resulting from random uctuations in load and renewable capacities and losing communication
and control capabilities due to communication link failures. The objective function we consider is
minimize
X
i2G
Cipi +
NnodesX
i=1
NnodesX
j=1
Bi;jXi;j +
jSjX
s=1
X
i2G
scs

C+i p
+
s;i + C
 
i p
 
s;i

+
jSjX
s=1
X
i2G
scs

D+i  
+
s;i +D
 
i  
 
s;i

; (4.1)
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where the minimization is over the problem decisions variables given in Table 4.1. The variables
p+s;i and p
 
s;i are, respectively, the positive and negative parts of the decision variable ps;i
which represents the adjustment in the dispatch level for generator/load i 2 G under scenario
s 2 S.
Table 4.1: Problem Decision Variables
Variable Description
p Vector of rst settlement dispatch levels for
all loads and generators
ps Vector of adjustments in the rst settlement dispatch
levels under scenario s 2 S
X Comm. links leased. A binary Nnodes Nnodes matrix
Yc Matrix of Communication ow under link failure
scenario c 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N commscenariosg
wc Vector of node reachability from control center under
communication link failure scenario c 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N commscenariosg
We formally dene them by including
ps;i = p
+
s;i  p s;i 8s 2 S; i 2 G; (4.2)
p+s;i  0 8s 2 S; i 2 G; (4.3)
p s;i  0 8s 2 S; i 2 G; (4.4)
in our problem's constraints. Similarly,  +s;i and  
 
s;i are the positive and negative parts of the
variable  s;i. The variable  s;i represents the dierence between the dispatch level and the capacity
of generator/load i under scenario s. Since we take generating power to be positive and consuming
it to be negative,  +s;i and  
 
s;i are dened by the constraints
pi +ps;i   pmaxs;i =  +s;i     s;i 8s 2 S; (4.5)
 +s;i  0 8s 2 S; (4.6)
  s;i  0 8s 2 S; (4.7)
when i 2 G corresponds to a generator. When i corresponds to a load (4.5) is replaced with
pi +ps;i   pmins;i =  +s;i     s;i 8s 2 S: (4.8)
The decision variables Yc 8 c 2 C and wc 8 c 2 C do not appear in the objective function but
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their values have a very signicant role in aecting the optimal solution. We explain the role of Yc
and wc next by rst introducing the remainder of the constraints we consider that we categorize
into
 Communication network constraints,
 Power grid constraints,
 Joint power and communication constraints,
and describe separately in the following subsections.
4.2.1 Communication Constraints
Communication constraints determine the system's ability to relay sensor measurements to
the control center and the control center's ability to adjust power dispatch levels. Successful
communication between sensors and the control centered is modeled by the existence of a path
consisting of leased communication links connecting the control center to the load or renewable
generator. We describe the initial communication topology as an undirected graph representing a
`ow' network whose topology is chosen as a rst-settlement decision variable. The rst-settlement
constraints setting up our failure-free communication network are
X = XT (4.9)
Xi;i = 0; 8 i 2 N (4.10)
Xi;j 2 f0; 1g8 i 2 N ; j 2 N ; (4.11)
where N , f1; 2; : : : ; Nnodesg and X is the matrix whose (i; j)th element is given by Xi;j and is
thus the adjacency matrix of the communication network.
A node in the communication network is either a sensor node, the control center, or a relay node.
Since there can only be one control center, the size of X is one more than the sum of Nsensors (the
number of sensor nodes) and Nrelays (the number of relay nodes). Each sensor node is assigned
a ow supply of positive one, each relay node is assigned zero supply, and the control center is
assigned a supply equal to  Nsensors. Then, for every link failure scenario, the communication
network will attempt to send a unit of `ow' along its active links from each sensor node to the
control center. If an active path connecting the control center to a sensor exists, they are able
to exchange realized capacity updates and control commands. If no active path exists between a
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certain sensor node and the control center, we shut o that sensor's supply under that scenario by
setting it to zero and also adjusting the `ow' demand of the control center to accommodate the
supply loss. We formally state these conditions by the following second-settlement communication
network constraints, which are all repeated for every c 2 C
0  Y ci;j ; Y ci;j 2 N 8 i 2 N ; j 2 N ; (4.12)
Y ci;j + Y
c
j;i MQci;jXi;j ; 8 i 2 N ; j 2 N ; (4.13)
NnodesX
t=1
Y ci;t  
NnodesX
t=1
Y ct;i = 1  wci ; 8 sensor i 2 N ; (4.14)
NnodesX
t=1
Y ci;t  
NnodesX
t=1
Y ct;i = 0; 8 relay i 2 N ; (4.15)
NnodesX
t=1
Y cj;t  
NnodesX
t=1
Y ct;j =
NsensorsX
i=1
wci  Nsensors; (4.16)
wci  1 
NnodesX
t=1
Y cj;t; 8 sensor i 2 N ; (4.17)
wci 2 f0; 1g8 sensor i 2 N ; (4.18)
where the elements Qci;j in (4.13) make up the symmetric and binary Nnodes Nnodes parameter
matrix QC that species the failed communication links under scenario c 2 C. Constraint (4.13)
is of great importance since it sets the capacity of every link (i; j) in the communication network
to M > 0 if and only if the link (i; j) was leased in the rst settlement (true when Xi;j = 1) and it
was free from any failures (true when Qci;j = 1) under c the considered scenario. M in constraint
(4.13) is chosen as a suciently large positive number such that link (i; j) eectively has unlimited
capacity when it is active1. For the remainder of the chapter, we will refer to links that have been
leased by the operator and are free from failures as active communication links and we otherwise
refer to them as inactive links.
Constraints (4.14)-(4.18) set up the ow problem between the sensors and the control center
and adjust their supplies when no path of active communication links exists between a sensor
node and the control center. Based on constraints (4.12)-(4.18), decision variables Y ci;j represent
the amount of `communication ow' between nodes i and j under scenario c 2 C and the binary
decision variable wci is equal to one only if no path exists connecting sensor node i to the control
center and the sensor supply is therefore shut o.
1While M may be chosen to be arbitrarily large, we set it to M = Nsensors since the amount of ow along any
link cannot exceed the total ow supply in the network
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Remark 3. For constrains (4.12)-(4.18) to function as just explained, the cost parameters in the
objective function, given in (4.1), must be chosen such that losing connectivity between a sensor
node and the control center has a positive net eect on the objective function. Choosing the cost
parameters in a manner that does not satisfy this condition is not reasonable as we see no possible
practical situation where losing communications will be benecial to the system operator.
Next, we present our constraints that deal solely with the power grid before presenting our joint
power and communication constraints which specify the eects of losing connectivity between a
sensor and the control center.
4.2.2 Power Grid Constraints
Power grid constraints are the most typical constraints in a standard OPF problem and since
they represent physical constraints, they must be satised in both the rst and second settlement.
For the rst settlement, we express these constraints as
X
i2G
pi = 0; (4.19)
X
i2G
k;ipi  tmaxk ; 8 power lines k; (4.20)
pmini  pi  pmaxi ; 8i 2 G; (4.21)
where (4.19) is a power balance constraint requiring the total power generated to be equal to
the total power consumed, k;i is an element from the power transfer distribution factor (PTDF)
matrix [98] such that (4.20) are line ow capacity constraints ensuring that the power owing
through lines in the power grid does not exceed the line's thermal limit. Constraint (4.21) is a
capacity constraint limiting the amount of power we can draw from a generator or supply to a
load. We take pi > 0 to represent generating power and pi < 0 to represent consuming power so
we set pmini = 0; p
max
i  0 for generators and pmini  0; pmaxi = 0 for loads.
After the stochastic events are realized, the system operator must choose ps;i 8s 2 S; i 2 G
(the second-settlement recourse actions) and adjust the power dispatch levels according to the
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realized scenario s 2 S. Therefore, for each scenario s 2 S, we will have the constraints
X
i2G
ps;i = 0; (4.22)
X
i2G
Aki(pi +ps;i)  tmaxk ; 8k; (4.23)
pmini  pi +ps;i  pmaxi ; 8i a conventional generator; (4.24)
where constraints (4.22)-(4.23) correspond to constraints (4.19)-(4.20) respectively. The constraints
dened by (4.24) represent generation limits for conventional generators which we model as being
independent of the communication network or capacity forecasts. The second settlement con-
straints corresponding to constraint (4.21) for loads and renewable generators are given in the
following subsection as they are aected by both the status of the communication network and the
random capacity uctuations in the power grid.
4.2.3 Joint Power and Communication Constraints
This set of constraints species the possible eects of losing communications between a sensor
node and the control center. When a sensor node is disconnected, the system operator will force the
disconnected load/generator to draw/generate a pre-set amount of power pno commi . For example,
if pno commi = 0, then the system operator and load/generator i have an agreement to disconnect
from the grid if the they are unable to communicate with each other. In the numerical results, we
explore an alternative agreement where loads and generators do no completely disconnect from the
grid when their communication fails. We express our joint power and communication constraints
as
wc;ip
no comm
i  pi +ps;i  wc;ipno commi + (1  wc;i)pmaxs;i
8 s  (a; b; c) 2 S; (4.25)
when i represents a renewable generator and as
(1  wc;i)pmins;i + wc;ipno commi  pi +ps;i  wc;ipno commi
8 s  (a; b; c) 2 S; (4.26)
when i represents a load.
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Taking everything together, our stochastic OPF problem minimizes the objective function (4.1)
subject to the large set of constraints (4.2)-(4.26). In the following section, we present several
numerical results and some key ndings obtained using our stochastic OPF model.
4.3 Numerical Results and Discussion
In this section, we provide numerical results validating our presented model. We also present
results describing the optimal communication topology under dierent conditions and stochastic
events. For our results, we focus on the standard IEEE 9-bus system where we assume the rst
generator represents a renewable energy source and that all loads in the grid are controllable. Thus,
we have one renewable generator, two conventional generators, and 3 controllable loads which we
refer to as generators 1  6 respectively since we may consider loads as `negative' generators.
Throughout this section, we set oncomm = 0:9 so that the probability for any communication link
to fail is 0:1. We further assume that the pmfs representing the forecasts for load and renewable
generation are described by three capacity levels making Nrenewlevels = N
load
levels = 3. where the middle
level is the most probable outcome and, hence, represents the forecast value.
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the observed load capacities behave the same relative to
their forecast value in the sense that, under any given scenario, the loads will all be either below,
at, or above their own forecast level. The numerical results presented in this section all use the
pmfs given in Table 4.2 to describe the possible realized capacity values.
Table 4.2: Forecast pmfs for stochastic Generators
Level Prob Gen. 1 Gen. 4 Gen. 5 Gen. 6
LOW 0:25 170  85:5  95  118:75
FORECAST 0:50 200  90  100  125
HI 0:25 230  94:5  105  131:25
For the presented results, we adopted a strategy where Pno commi is set to LOW forecast if i is
the renewable source and Pno commi is set to the HI forecast if the i represents a load. The adopted
strategy may be regarded as a defensive, or worst-case, strategy since losing communications might
force us to oversupply power to loads and under-utilize the cheapest generator in the system.
Other variables held constant for all the results we present in this section are the cost parameters
given in Table 4.3. The cost values given in Table 4.3 were chosen and tuned in order for the optimal
solutions obtained with our model to represent reasonable real world decisions.
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Under the given cost structure, the system operator will always prefer to dispatch the free
renewable generation rst and will always aim to satisfy the load demands communicated to the
control center. Although costs C4; C5; C6 are all positive, they actually reward the system operator
Table 4.3: Values for Select Cost Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
C1 0 C
+
1 , C
 
1 0
C2 60 C
+
2 , C
 
2 120
C3 40 C
+
3 , C
 
3 80
C4; C5; C6 1000
C+4 ; C
+
5 ; C
+
6 200 C
 
4 ; C
 
5 ; C
 
6 200
D+1 , D
 
1 500
D+2 , D
 
2 0 D
+
3 , D
 
3 0
D+4 ; D
+
5 ; D
+
6 1000 D
 
4 ; D
 
5 ; D
 
6 5000
for delivering power to loads in the system since their power consumption is negative. Costs C+i ; C
 
i
for i = 1; 2; : : : ; 6 penalize the operator for the dierent adjustments in dispatch levels while costs
D+i ; D
 
i for i = 1; 2; : : : ; 6 penalize the operator if the net dispatch of the renewable generator is
below its measured capacity or if the net dispatch for a load is dierent from its capacity. The
only model parameter left to specify is Bi;j for i; j 2 N which represents the cost to lease links in
the communication network.
For all the presented results, we set Bi;j = B for all i; j 2 N . Figure 4.2 shows the impact
of increasing B on the optimal number of leased communication links in a 5-node (4 sensors
and 1 control center) communication network supporting the operation of an IEEE 9-bus system.
Since we have Nnodes = 5 nodes in the communication network, the maximum possible number of
communication links is 0:5Nnodes(Nnodes  1) = 10 which corresponds with the optimal number of
leased links in Figure 4.2 when the cost is very close zero. As the cost to lease a communication
link is increased, Figure 4.2 allows us determine the cuto points where the number of leased
communication links must be decreased as it will no longer be justied by the added communication
paths they may provide. In fact, our model provides us with the actual optimal topology under any
given cost and Figure 4.3 provides optimal topologies obtained when the optimal number of leased
links was eight, six, ve, and four. The optimal topology with four links is not surprising since
it simply establishes direct connections between each generator and the control center. Optimal
topologies with extra links, however, were not always straightforward to justify. For example, the
optimal topology with six links displays a higher preference towards keeping generator six, which
is the largest load in the network, connected to the control center over any of the other stochastic
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generators. Of the three loads, generator six has the largest capacity deviations over its possible
realized capacity values so the preference towards maintaining connection with it may be regarded
to be lowering the probability that the system operator will have to incur the large cost associated
with re-dispatching generator six to meet its realized demand or for over-supplying it with power
when the communication with it is lost.
Figure 4.4 shows the change in the optimal objective value as B the leasing cost per link
is increased for the same 5-node communication network supporting an IEEE 9-bus system we
considered for Figure 4.2. As B is increased, the objective function is linear over the intervals
where the optimal communication topology is unchanged since the only change in the objective
function will be the number of communication links leased multiplied by the amount of increase
in B. Further, since the optimal number of leased communication links is a decreasing function in
B, the slope of the linear segments making up the objective function will also decrease with B as
it is equal to the total number of leased communication links. As a result, the objective function
is a concave function in B which can be easily observed from Figure 4.4.
The same experiments whose results are presented in Figures 4.2-4.4 were run for a communi-
cation network of size 6 where the extra communication node was taken as a relay. The results
obtained with 6 nodes in the communication network were nearly identical to the ones presented
in 4.2-4.4 with the main dierence being that the optimal communication network would lease all
15 links when B is very close to zero and, therefore, those results were omitted.
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Figure 4.2: Number of links leased vs. increasing link costs for a 5-node communication network
supporting an IEEE 9-Bus system
Figures 4.2-4.4 show results where we consider every possible combination of communication
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(a) 8 Links Leased (b) 6 Links Leased (c) 5 Links Leased (d) 4 Links Leased
Figure 4.3: Optimal Topologies for Dierent Numbers of Links Leased
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Figure 4.4: Optimal objective value vs. increasing link costs for a 5-node communication network
supporting an IEEE 9-Bus system
link failures. As a result, the communication topologies obtained under such conditions take
into account what might be extreme and highly unlikely scenarios where all the links in the
communication network may fail. In reality, it is perhaps more reasonable to only consider scenarios
where at most only a few links may fail at the same time.
Figure 4.5 shows the optimal number of leased communication links asK the maximum number
of communication links that may fail at any given time is increased from 1 to its maximum value
of 10 under several dierent values for B. Similar to the results from Figure 4.2 (where K was
xed at 10), Figure 4.5 indicates that the optimal number of leased communication links decreases
as B is increased. More importantly, Figure 4.5 indicates that the optimal number of leased
communication links increases with K which should be expected as more communication links
would be needed to defend against the increased risk of having more links fail at the same time.
With K = 1, the optimal communication topology leased 5 links and arranged them, as indicated
in Figure 4.3c, such that the communication network is a single loop. A loop topology provides the
ability for all the generators to remain connected to the control center under any single link failure
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so the system operator will not gain from leasing any additional links. With K = 2, the optimal
communication topology required 8 links arranged according to Figure 4.3a where all the sensors
would remain connected under any two-link failure scenario. We note that the optimal link choice
is not unique for the 5 link topology since the order of the dierent generators in the loop will have
no aect on the scenario probabilities or any other factor in the optimization problem. The same
is true for the 8 link topology where the actual leased link may be exchanged with another set of
links as long as the general network structure is preserved.
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Figure 4.5: Number of links leased vs. maximum number of failed links for a 5-node communication
network supporting an IEEE 9-Bus system
Finally, Figure 4.6 provides plots showing the change in the optimal objective value as K is
increased under the same cost values considered for Figure 4.5. Figure 4.6 seems to indicate that
the optimal objective function is also concave in K. While this is associated with the fact that
the number of leased links is an increasing function of K, having higher K values changes the
probabilities of the dierent stochastic scenarios so proving that the objective function is concave
in K may be more complex. Figure 4.6 also demonstrates that accounting for a single link failure
could greatly underestimate the optimal objective value for the full problem accounting for all
the possible failure scenarios and that considering just a few more failures may lead us to a more
accurate estimate.
Our formulation relies on enumerating all possible communication link failures and so the
number of scenarios in the full problem grows exponentially with every added link in the system. As
a result, applying our full model to larger power grids and their possible communication networks
may not be practical from a numerical viewpoint. Fortunately, this problem in not unique to our
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Figure 4.6: Optimal objective value vs. maximum number of failed links for a 5-node communica-
tion network supporting an IEEE 9-Bus system
model and there are many techniques in the literature discussing possible methods of reducing
the size of a stochastic optimization problem in a manner that preserves its essence and closely
approximates its optimal solution. One of the possible solutions was already introduced in this
chapter by considering smaller values of K since that decreases the total number of communication
scenarios. Other possible solutions may include well-established techniques in the literature on
sampling, see [99{102] for example. Also, there may be practical considerations that limit the
problem's numerical complexity. For example, establishing a communication link between nodes
associated with loads or generators that are suciently far away from each other in the power
grid may not be possible in the real world and so we may be able to exclude such links from our
analysis.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a novel two-settlement stochastic OPF model accounting for
failures in communication as well as errors in forecasting loads and renewable generation. Our OPF
model's decision variables extend beyond power dispatch and re-dispatch decisions to include the
decision variables identifying the optimal topology for the communication network supporting the
considered power system. We presented several numerical results on the optimal communication
network supporting an IEEE 9-bus system. Based on the presented results, we are able to determine
the eect that increasing the per link cost for leasing a communication network will have on the
optimal communication topology and we are able to uncover preferences towards establishing more
73
communication paths between certain sensors in the grid and the control center that are not be
obvious.
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Chapter 5
Topology Estimation in Power
Distribution Networks
In this chapter, we consider the case where sensors are placed at nodes in the system and
we assume that endowing a node with a sensor allows us to measure the power ow along every
line incident to that node. We present a novel topology estimation scheme for radial distribution
networks based on slow-changing nodal demand forecasts and power ow measurements obtained
from sensors installed at subset a of the nodes. Also included in this chapter is a proposed
sensor placement scheme based on a deterministic treatment of the load forecasts. The sensor
placement obtained by following the proposed scheme allows for the identication of any number
of detectable faults in the system. Numerical results are presented demonstrating the performance
of our topology estimation scheme for the case where the distribution network is the IEEE-123
bus test feeder and the employed sensors are placed at the locations obtained by following our
proposed sensor placement scheme.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a de-
scription of the system model and introduce some of our notation. In Section 5.2, we present the
fault detection problem along with our proposed sensor placement scheme. Next in Section 5.3,
we describe our novel topology estimation approach. Section 5.4 presents numerical results where
we employ our proposed sensor placement scheme along with the presented topology estimation
approach to detect randomly generated faults in the IEEE 123-bus distribution feeder. Finally,
Section 5.5 summarizes our results and concludes this chapter.
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5.1 System Description and Notation
We consider power distribution networks operated in a radial (tree) structure where the power
is supplied to the feeder at the root node of the tree. We assume that all lines in the network are
susceptible to faults except for the line connecting the root node to the main power grid. We focus
on detecting the number and location of faults in the network by relying on forecasts of nodal
power demands and power ow measurements obtained from a limited number of carefully placed
sensors.
We assume the complete error-free network topology is known and described by the graph
Tfull = (V;E) where the nodes are given by V = fv0; v1; : : : ; vNg and the lines are given by
E = fe1; e2; : : : ; eNg where en , (vm; vn) and vm is the parent node of vn. Figure 5.1 shows a
simple tree demonstrating our naming convention.
Sensor placements are dened as a set of nodes P where P  V and we denote by E(P) the set
of lines whose power ows are measured under placement P. If a node is endowed with a sensor,
we are able to measure the power ow along all lines incident to that node and, therefore, we may
dene E(P) as
E(P) = fej e  E and e is incident on some v 2 Pg: (5.1)
Each node in the network is taken to have a power demand (load) that must be supplied through
a fault-free path connecting it to the root node. Nodal power demands are set to zero if the node
serves as a relay which is a common function of at least a few nodes in any real world distribution
network. Nonzero nodal demands are assumed to be based on load forecasts and are denoted by
the vector d+ = (di1 ; di2 ; : : : ; diM )
T where dim represents the load forecast for the (im)
th node with
im 2 f1; : : : ; Ng andM  N is the number of nodes having a nonzero demand forecast. Since nodal
load forecasts are typically based on infrequent grid measurements, historical data, and prevailing
weather conditions, they are bound to have some errors and other inaccuracies. We assume the
forecasting errors may be modeled as additive noise such that ~d+ = ( ~di1 ;
~di2 ; : : : ;
~diM )
T the vector
of realized nodal demands is jointly Gaussian with zero mean and a known diagonal covariance
matrix  = 2I of size M resulting in the vector ~d+ being distributed as ~d+  N(d+;).
Under a radial network drawing power from its root, the power ow through a line en 2 E is
given as the sum of the demand for node vn and all the nodes downstream from vn. Thus, the
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Figure 5.1: Tree showing naming convention
measured power ow through line en 2 E is given by
yTtrue(en) =
X
i2Downstream(vn;Ttrue)
~di; (5.2)
where Downstream(vn; Ttrue) is a function returning a set comprised of n and the indices of all
the nodes downstream from vn in Ttrue the unknown true (actual) network topology. Based on our
assumption for the noise in the load forecasts, a nonzero yTtrue(en) will be normally distributed
with a mean yTtrue(en) given by the right hand side of (5.2) where each nonzero d^i value is replaced
by di (its forecast) and a variance equal to 
2 multiplied by the number of downstream nodes with
nonzero forecasts.
Faults are modeled as a loss in any number of lines in the network and are given by F  E
such that the resulting faulted network is a forest Ffault = (V;Ef ) where Ef , E n F and jF j are
both unknown. Because Tfull, the error-free network, is a single connected tree, every line fault
will increase the number of trees in the faulted graph describing the network by one. Thus, if we
suppose that jF j = k faults have occurred, the graph describing the faulted network Ffault is a
forest comprised of k + 1 components or trees T0; T1; T2; : : : ; Tk.
Since power is drawn solely from the root node, only one of the trees comprising Ffault will be
energized and that will be tree the containing the root node which we denote by T0 without any
loss in generality since the numbering is arbitrary. T0 may be described as T0 = (V0; E0) where
V0  V and E0  Ef  E are respectively the set of nodes and lines that remain connected to the
power feeder after the occurrence of all the faults. As a result, all the lines not included in E0 will
have zero power owing through them and all sensor measurements collected under any possible
placement on these lines will be equal to zero. Therefore, a fault occurring in a line (vm; vn) where
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both vm 6= V0 and vn 6= V0 will have no eect on the grid-connected part of the system or any of
the measurements collected from lines in E0. The detection of this type of faults excluded from
our analysis Denition 1 highlights this type of faults and the reason for excluding them.
Denition 1 (Topologically Undetectable Faults). Any fault aecting a line (vi; vj) 2 E that
would otherwise still be excluded from the grid-connected part of the network will have no eect on
any possible measurement under any possible sensor placement. Such a fault carries no practical
signicance on the topology estimation problem and is called a topologically undetectable fault.
An alternate description of a topologically undetectable fault is given in [70, 71] where it is
dened as a fault occurring downstream from another fault and the authors of [70,71] also excluded
these faults from their analysis.
Next, we provide a brief description of the fault detection problem and present our sensor
placement scheme.
5.2 Sensor Placement and The Fault Detection Problem
To better explain our proposed sensor placement scheme, we rst dene the fault detection
problem. An optimal detector solving the topology estimation (fault detection) problem must
determine both the number of faults and the lines aected by those faults. We consider the case
where the detector is based on the knowledge of Tfull (the fault-free network topology), nodal load
forecasts, and the sensor measurementsY = (y(en1); y(en2); : : : ; y(enjPj))
T . One possible detection
method is to employ a maximum likelihood (ML) detector that may be expressed as
F^ 2 argmax
F2P(E)
Pr(Yjd^+; F ); (5.3)
where F is a set containing the lines that are in outage, P(E) is the superset of E, and F^ is chosen
after enumerating over all elements of P(E). Sadly, the size of P(E) is exponential in jEj (the
number of links in the network) making enumerating all the possible fault scenarios infeasible for
most real distribution networks. The number of fault scenarios was shown in [71] to still grow
exponentially in jEj for a worst case distribution network even after excluding all topologically
undetectable faults. However, the authors of [71] were able to show that the ML detection problem
(5.3) may be decoupled and solved over smaller disjoint subtrees in the network as long as each
subtree is rooted at a node where the amount of power it draws from its parent node is measured
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under the employed sensor placement. As a result, having a few sensors measuring power ows
along several lines in the network can help us solve (5.3) by decoupling the full distribution network
into smaller and more manageable problems.
Ambiguity in the ML detector (5.3) is another problem aecting the detection performance.
This problem occurs when the sensor locations are such that multiple fault scenarios result in the
same expected ow along the lines we measure. In most cases, adding carefully placed sensors
to the network will enable us to dierentiate between the dierent faults causing the ambiguity.
This may be done by placing a sensor closer to the lines whose failure is causing the ambiguity
of the detector. An example showing the eect of sensor placement on our ability to identify and
dierentiate between all detectable faults is demonstrated in Figure 5.2. The gray nodes in Figure
5.2 represent a node endowed with a sensor, which allows us to measure the power ow along all
the lines incident to it, and the number next to each node represents the node's load or demand.
With the sensor placed at v0 in Figure 5.2a, we are able to observe the power ow only along
line e1 where we expect the measured ow to belong to the set C(e1) = f0; 10; 30; 50g. Since the
demands for nodes v2 and v3 are both 20, all the values in C(e1) can be mapped to unique detectable
fault scenarios except for 30 which represents either of e2 and e3 being in outage. Alternatively,
placing the sensor at v1 in Figure 5.2b allows us to measure the power ow along e1, e2, and e3.
This placement now enables us to distinguish between the case where e2 is in outage and the case
where e3 is in outage since the sets of expected ow measurements are C(e2) = f0; 20g for e2 and
C(e3) = f0; 20g for e3 and each value in both sets now maps to a unique fault. Note that if v0
was connected to other nodes and having a sensor there was required so that other faults in the
network remain distinguishable, we would have needed to add an extra sensor at v1 instead of
simply moving the one at v0.
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(a) Faults in e2 and
e3 indistinguishable
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(b) Faults in e2 and
e3 are distinguishable
Figure 5.2: The eect of sensor placement on the ability to distinguish faults
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Unfortunately, there are fault scenarios that result in cases where the ambiguity of the ML
detector (5.3) cannot be resolved under any possible sensor placement. This type of faults exists
due to having relay nodes with zero load demand. Consider for example the tree and sensor
placement given in Figure 5.2b but suppose that v1 is a relay node with zero demand instead of
10. In this case, we will be unable to distinguish between the scenario where e1 is in outage and
the scenario where both e2 and e3 are in outage although our sensor allows us to measure the ow
along every line in the network. We refer to this type of faults as numerically indistinguishable
since distinguishing between them is not possible by any detector under any sensor placement and
they are indistinguishable due to the numerical value of a node's demand. We call a group of such
faults that are all associated with the same expected ow measurements as a set of numerically
indistinguishable faults. Throughout this chapter, we consider the occurrence of a fault from a set
of numerically indistinguishable faults as being equivalent to having all the faults in that set occur
and we consider the detection of a fault that is numerically indistinguishable as being equivalent
to detecting all the faults from the same set.
In the next subsection, we present a sensor placement scheme where the sensor locations are
chosen such that numerically indistinguishable faults are the only indistinguishable faults in the
network.
5.2.1 Proposed Placement Scheme
In this subsection, we propose a sensor placement scheme for the purpose of detecting faults in
a radial distribution network based on nodal load forecasts and line ow measurements. The ob-
tained sensor locations result in all topologically detectable faults in the network being identiable.
Denition 2 formalizes the concept of identiability.
Denition 2 (Identiable faults). A fault in line en is identiable under a given placement and
nodal load forecasts if the expected power ow along em, the rst line endowed with a sensor along
the path from vn to v0 (the root node), is unique under all topologically detectable faults involving
en and any or none of the lines that are downstream from vm along em. The uniqueness of the
expected ow along em is allowed to be violated only when numerically indistinguishable faults are
being considered.
Our placement scheme is given in Algorithm 5.1 as the recursive function Placement. The
presented method depends on the functionsChild, UpFlow, UpdateTopology, Size, IsEmpty,
and CombineVects that are all briey described in Appendix 5.6. The sensor placement for the
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full distribution network is obtained by calling the function Placement with the inputs vn set as
the root node, P chosen as an empty set, T chosen as Tfull (the fault-free distribution network),
and the vector d = (d0; d1; : : : ; dN )
T constructed such that di is the load forecast for node i and
di = 0 when vi is a relay node.
Since the detection problem may be decoupled over disjoint subtrees rooted at a node whose
incoming power ow is measured by a sensor [71], the set of expected ow values for a line may be
constructed through considering the subtree it belongs to as an isolated network independent from
the remainder of the distribution network. The diculty in taking advantage of the decoupling of
the problem is that it is by placing the sensors that we create the subtrees over which the problem
may be decoupled.
Our proposed placement approach starts at the root node and traverses the tree in a depth-rst
search manner while constructing arrays (vectors) of expected power ows for the lines it visits.
The full vector of expected power ows for a line en is constructed only after visiting all child
nodes of vn so the complete vectors we construct start at leaf nodes of the tree. The constructed
vectors continue to grow as we backtrack from leaf nodes since they will always have a unique
set of expected power ows (a leaf node cannot have zero demand) and, therefore, no sensors are
placed at leaf nodes. We also do not place sensors at nodes having a single child, since if vn is
a node with only one child node, the expected power ows for the line en will always be unique,
provided the node does not have a zero demand. If node vn has a single child and its demand is
zero, the repeated value in the expected ows for line en is discarded since it is associated with
a numerically indistinguishable fault. As a result, we only place sensors at a node vm with more
than one child node if the expected power ow values for line em are not all unique.
Choosing to place a sensor at vm creates a subtree that we may ignore when continuing to
traverse the remainder of the distribution network due to the decoupling in the ML detection
problem. Therefore, when we backtrack from a node where we decided to place a sensor (Lines
41-45 in Algorithm 5.1), we return to the parent node an empty array of expected ow values.
Otherwise, if the elements in the vector of expected ow measurements are all unique and no
sensor is required at vm, we continue to grow the vector until another sensor is placed or we nish
traversing the remainder of the tree.
Having repeated values in the vector of expected ows for a line en indicates that some faults
occurring downstream of the node vn will be unidentiable if the sensor is placed at vn's parent.
Therefore, it is by construction that our presented scheme ensures that all the detectable faults in
81
the network will be identiable since we use the test for repeated values in the vector of expected
ows for ever line we visit as the condition for including a sensor in the placement. Further, the
obtained placement is guaranteed to have the minimum number of sensors required to achieve
identiability. This can be explained by rst supposing that we remove a sensor from the obtained
placement. By construction, removing any sensor from the obtained placement is guaranteed to
result in having some unidentiable faults. We could attempt to recover identiability in the
network by changing the locations of some of the sensors we did not remove. However, we are
unable to move any of the remaining sensors upstream since doing so was originally prevented
by the algorithm because it would have led to having unidentiable faults. Moving a sensor
downstream and closer to the location of the removed sensor will not work either since we will be
required to move it all the way to the location of the removed sensor and that would lead us to a
case equivalent to the one we are trying to solve my moving the sensor. Thus, no other placement
scheme can guarantee the identiability of all faults in the network while also employing fewer
sensors than we require under our proposed placement scheme.
Next, Remark 4 discusses the eect of having noisy nodal load forecasts on the detectability of
identiable faults and then we present our fault detection scheme.
Remark 4. It is important to note that having a placement where all detectable faults satisfy
Denition 2 does not guarantee their perfect detection when noise is added to the system. For
example, consider the case where the distribution network and sensor placement are given in Figure
5.2a and suppose that the nodal loads forecasts for v2 and v3 are respectively 19:9 and 20:1. In
this case, all faults in the network are identiable but if the variance of the noise aecting the load
forecasts is suciently large, the performance of a fault detector relying on measurements of power
ow along e1 will likely be unfavorable unless we are able to collect a suciently large number of
measurements for the ow on e1 in order to obtain a better estimate of the mean power along e1.
On the other hand, having a placement where some faults fail to satisfy Denition 2 guarantees
that any employed detection method will not be able to dierentiate between those fault under any
number of collected measurements, and even in the absence of noise, since the mapping between
the expected ow measurements and the possible fault scenarios will not be unique.
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5.3 Fault Detection Scheme
This section presents a novel fault detection scheme under the problem setup described in
Section 5.1. In the absence of noise, our approach will detect all the topologically detectable
faults in the network if the employed sensor placement is such that all faults in the system are
identiable. If the sensor placement is such that there are some unidentiable faults in the system,
our presented approach will detect all the possible fault scenarios that map to the measured power
ows.
We rst summarize the steps taken by our scheme and then provide more detailed descriptions
of the steps afterwards:
1. For every node endowed with a sensor, remove any directly identiable faults on the lines
connecting the node to its children.
2. Identify all the lines measuring zero ow.
3. Adjust the expected ow along the remaining lines in E(P) based on Step 1 and Step 2.
4. Test if the ow on the lines with nonzero ow matches with the updated expected ows,
starting with the deepest lines rst.
5. Identify subtrees as the ones where the expected ow along the line separating the tree
from the network is signicantly dierent from its expected value and estimate the dierence
between the measured ow and its expected value.
6. Generate a vector of expected ows for each identied subtree with faults having expected
ow smaller than the dierence estimated in Step 5.
7. Use ML to detect faults in the subtree.
8. Check for faults on lines connected to nodes endowed with a sensor from above.
9. Generate estimate of grid-connected tree based on results from Step 1, Step 7, and Step 8.
Since installing a sensor at a node vn allows us to measure the ow on every line incident on it,
if we measure zero ow along a line drawing power from vn but measure a positive ow on the line
en, then we may directly identify that a fault has occurred on the line with zero ow. Identifying
and removing such faults is done in Step 1 of the proposed approach. Step 2 simply identies
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the lines with zero ow and Step 3 simply adjusts our expected values of Y according to Step 1
and Step 2.
Next in Step 4, for all the lines with a nonzero measured ow, and following a decreasing
depth order, we test whether the measured ow matches with our expected value for it where the
test is formulated as the simple binary hypothesis
H0 : yTtrue(en) = yTupdated(en);
H1 : yTtrue(en) < yTupdated(en); (5.4)
where yTupdated(en), which is obtained by using (5.2) after replacing ~di with di, is our updated
expected value for yTtrue(en) (the measured ow on line en). The hypothesis under H1 in (5.4) is
one sided since we expect the mean ow on a line to decrease under a fault. Under our assumption of
additive white Gaussian noise for the errors in load forecasts, deciding between the two hypotheses
may be done based on
zn =
 
yTtrue(en)  yTupdated(en)
2
2
; (5.5)
for a chosen value of  and later comparing zn to a threshold value obtained under a given desired
false alarm probability.
For every line en identied in Step 4 as having a ow that is less than its expected value,
in Step 5 we identify all the lines and nodes downstream from vn in our network as an isolated
subtree S(en) and we update Tupdated after each such step. Further, we associate with each isolated
subtree a value y(en) = yTtrue(en)   yTupdated(en) which is the dierence between the measured
ow on en and our expected value for it.
Next in Step 6, for each identied subtree S(en), we generate a vector of expected power ows
under all the detectable faults that may occur in S(en). Generating the vector of expected ows
under all possible faults could be computationally expensive. Thus, if there are single line faults
that would result in a y(en) that is signicantly larger than the one we obtained in Step 5,
we will choose to exclude it from the process of generating the vector of expected power ows
for the subtree. We formulate the test determining whether to include faults involving a line en
in the generation of the vector of expected power ows for a subtree S(en) as the simple binary
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hypothesis
H0 : (yn)  yTtrue(en)  yS(en)nem(en);
H1 : (yn) > yTtrue(en)  yS(en)nem(en); (5.6)
where yS(en)nem(es) represents the expected power ow on line en under the single fault scenario
where line em is in outage. If we accept H1 in (5.6), we may ignore all faults involving em when
constructing the vector of expected power ows for subtree S(en). To generate the vector of
expected power ows for Step 6, we may traverse S(en) using a depth rst search method as long
as we continue to accept H1 in (5.6). Then, if we nd a line where H1 in (5.6) is rejected, we can
generate a vector of expected power ows associated with the faults involving that line and all the
lines below it before backtracking and continuing to traverse the tree using depth rst search as
long as we accept H1. Once all the vectors of expected power ows are generated over the dierent
regions of S(en) where we accept H1, they can be used to create the vector of expected ows for
Step 6 by using the function CombineVects which is given in the Appendix and was previously
used by Algorithm 5:1.
In Step 7 and for each subtree S(en), we employ the ML detector given in (5.3) after replacing
P(E) with the set of faults that map to the values comprising the vector of expected ows obtained
in Step 6 and also replacing Y by the power ow measurement for line en. Step 7 is where we
tend to identify the majority of the faults in the network.
In Step 8, we focus on the faults occurring on lines en 2 E(P) when vn is a node endowed with
a sensor and the measured ow on en is zero. For every such line, if none of the faults identied
in Step 1 or Step 7 are on the upstream path from the vn to the root node (or the next node
endowed with a sensor), we declare the line en as being in outage. Finally, Step 9 combines all
the faults found in Step 1, Step 7, and Step 8 to produce a nal estimate of the gird connected
tree T0 and the set of topologically detectable faults.
The next section presents numerical results demonstrating the performance of the just presented
fault detection scheme for the case where the sensors in the system are installed according to the
placement scheme described in Section 5.2.
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5.4 Numerical Results
This section presents results demonstrating the performance of the fault detection scheme
proposed in Section 5.3 when the sensors in the network are placed according to the approach
given in Section 5.2. Throughout this section, we consider the case where the distribution network
is the IEEE 123-bus test distribution feeder where are all the switches are assumed to be at their
nominal positions and we take the load demands to be the sum of the spot loads over all three
phases.
For the IEEE 123-bus test feeder, the approach described in Section 5.2 will result in a sensor
placement with 20 sensors located at nodes
P =f1; 3; 8; 13; 18; 23; 26; 36; 40; 44; 57;
67; 76; 78; 81; 89; 93; 97; 105; 110g; (5.7)
where the node numbers in (5.7) follow those given in the documentation of the test feeder. Figure
5.3 shows the IEEE-123 bus feeder with the locations of the sensors under P indicated by circles.
Figure 5.3: IEEE 123-bust test feeder with the sensor placement obtained using our proposed
approach indicated
To test the performance of the estimation approach introduced in Section 5.3 under the sensor
placement given by (5.7), we rst set a value for the standard deviation  of the additive noise in
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the nodal load forecasts. Next, a number N1 is chosen at random and then we randomly select
N1 dierent lines in the network to be in outage. For every chosen value for , we repeat the
process of randomly choosing N1 followed by randomly generating N1 faults for 1000 dierent
runs. Afterwards, we record the number of runs where the faults identied by our approach were
all the topologically detectable faults that were randomly generated for that run. Then, we divide
the number of runs where we were successful and divide that by the number of runs (1000) in order
to obtain an estimate for the probability of detection of our approach.
Figure 5.4 includes plots showing the estimated probability of detection with our approach for
increasing values of the noise standard deviation of 0:1; 0:25; 0:5; 1;
p
2; 2. We note that the small-
est nodal demand in the IEEE-123 feeder is 20 so a standard deviation of 2 is quite signicant.
The two graphs in Figure 5.4 represent the case where we only rely on measurements of real power
ow (N = 1) for our fault detection and the case where we use both real and active power ow
measurements (N = 2) under the assumption that the noise in the two measurements is indepen-
dent and identically distributed (iid). From Figure 5.4, it easy to see that employing both real and
active power ow measurements signicantly increases our probability of detection, especially for
higher values of . This should be expected as including active power ow measurements doubles
the number of measurements we employ for our detection.
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Figure 5.4: Estimated probability of detection vs increasing values of noise standard deviation
under an unrestricted number of faults
The results from Figure 5.4 were obtained for the case where the number of faulted lines in
the network was chosen at random from a uniform distribution over the number of lines in the
feeder. Consequently, a large number of the generated faults scenarios involved cases where the
87
majority of the faults were undetectable since the probability that random fault is generated very
close to the root is relatively high when N1 is suciently large. Therefore, we decided to obtain
additional results where we restricted N1 to be chosen uniformly at random between 1 and 20
in order to generate more scenarios having topologically detectable faults at locations that are
far from the root node. Figure 5.5 also includes two graphs representing the performance of our
approach for the case where we rely only on measurements of real power ow (N = 1) for our fault
detection and the case where we use both real and active power ow measurements (N = 2) under
the assumption that the noise in the two measurements is iid. From Figure 5.5, it seems that the
probability of detection for our approach remains unchanged when compared to the results from
Figure 5.4 for small values of  whereas it was slightly lower in Figure 5.5 for larger values of .
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Figure 5.5: Estimated probability of detection vs increasing values of noise standard deviation
with number faults at most 20
Finally, Figure 5.6 shows the eect of increasing the number of measurements collected by each
sensor on our estimated probability of detection. The results for Figure 5.6 were obtained for the
case where we assumed that N = 1; 25; 50; 75; 100 measurements were collected by real power ow
measurements under xed load forecasts having iid additive white Gaussian noise with  = 2. The
results in Figure 5.6 show that only a small number of measurements is needed in order to achieve
signicant increases in the probability of detection. Figure 5.6 also shows that employing more
measurements will continue to improve the detection performance. This should be expected since
having more measurements allows us to obtain more accurate estimates for the mean power ow
along the lines we observe.
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Figure 5.6: Estimated probability of detection vs increasing number of measurements per sensor
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we focused on topology estimation and fault detection in radial distribution
networks based on noisy nodal demand forecasts and power ow measurements collected from a
subset of the lines in the network. We proposed a sensor placement scheme providing the mini-
mum number of sensors required such that all the topologically detectable faults in the network are
identiable. Afterwards, we described a novel fault detection scheme taking advantage of the de-
coupling of the ML detector over subtrees in the network. Finally, we presented several numerical
results where we employed our proposed sensor placement scheme along with the presented topol-
ogy estimation approach to detect randomly generated faults in the IEEE 123-bus distribution
feeder.
5.6 Appendix
Description of the Functions Employed by the Proposed Sensor Place-
ment Scheme
Throughout this appendix, we take vn to represent a node in the distribution network, d to
represent a vector of load demands, and T to represent the topology of a distribution network.
1. Child(vn; T ) : this function returns a set containing all child nodes of vn in the network T .
2. UpFlow(vn;d; T ) : The output of this function is a scalar quantity equal to the ow along
line en where en is the node connecting vn to its parent node. We may calculate the output
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using equation (5.2).
3. UpdateTopology(vn; T ) : This function return the network T after removing the line en
from it.
4. Size() : this function simply returns the size (or length) of the set or vector provided to it
as an input.
5. IsEmpty(x) : this function return a logical true if all elements of the vector x are unique
and returns a logical false otherwise.
6. CombineVects(x1;x2) : This function return a vector constructed from combining the
vectors x1 and x2 as described by Subroutine 5:1
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Algorithm 5.1: Placement(vn;P;d; T )
A recursive sensor placement scheme
1: Input: Node vn, old sensor placement set P, load forecasts d, and topology T
2: Result: Updated set P contains the proposed sensor placement
3: Begin
4: S = Child(vn, T )
5: s = Size(S)
6: if s == 0 then
7: flow vector = UpFlow(vn;d; T )
8: return
9: else if s == 1 then
10: [f vector;P; T ] = Placement(S;P;d; T )
11: if d[n] == 0 then
12: flow vector = f vector
13: else
14: flow vector = (f vector;UpFlow(vn;d; T ))T
15: end if
16: return
17: else
18: //Node vn has multiple child nodes
19: index = [ ]
20: for i = 1 to s do
21: [f vect i;P] = Placement(S[i];P;d; T )
22: if IsEmpty(f vect i) == 0 then
23: index:append(i)
24: end if
25: end for
26: if d[n] 6= 0 and Size(index) == 1 then
27: flow vector = (f vect index;UpFlow(vn;d; T ))
28: else if d[n] == 0 and Size(index) == 1 then
29: flow vector = (f vect index)
30: else
31: flow vector = [ ]
32: for j = 1 to Size(index) do
33: flow vector = CombineVects(flow vector; f vect index[j])
34: end for
35: end if
36: //Check if all values are unique
37: if unique(flow vector) == 1 then
38: return
39: else
40: //Place Sensor at vn
41: P = P [ vn
42: flow vector = [ ]
43: //Update expected ow above sensor
44: [T ] = UpdateTopology(vn; T )
45: return
46: end if
47: end if
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Subroutine 5.1: CombineVects(x1;x2)
1: Input: Vectors x1 and x2
2: Result: Vector x
3: Begin
4: n1 = Size(x1)
5: n2 = Size(x2)
6:
7: if n1 == 0 then
8: x = x2
9: return
10: else if n2 == 0 then
11: x = x1
12: return
13: end if
14:
15: x = (x1;x2)
T
16: for i = 1 to n1 do
17: for j = 1 to n2 do
18: x:append(x1[i] + x2[j])
19: end for
20: end for
21: return
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